# 1NC

## Offcase

### T-USFG – 1NC

#### Interpretation---the resolution divides of aff and neg ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research

#### The USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### Resolved means to enact by law

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend usfg action that substantially expands the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---Fairness---the neg should win on average 50% of the time---any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose---their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith

#### 2---Clash---debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third- and fourth-line responses---that’s key to effective politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs---their interpretation explodes limits, makes the aff conditional, and forces the neg into concessionary ground

### K – Cap – 1NC

#### Neolib isn’t a monolithic root cause but pervasive – micropolitics disseminates post-Fordist productivity into remote terrains of lived experience to corrupt dissent.

Papadopoulos 8 (Dimitris, School of Social Science @Cardiff U, Leicester Reader in Sociology and Organisation. “In the ruins of representation: Identity, individuality, subjectification”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 47.1, ebsco//shree)

The turn to micropolitics and the dissolution of the foundationalist understandings of identity (either in its essentialist or discursive reductionist versions) enable political analyses of previously neglected and effaced domains of everyday life. But do micropolitics effectively challenge state regulation and open pathways for the emergence of a multiplicity of different modes of embodied subjectification? Or does embodied subjectification become a new mode of state regulated existence? The power of micropolitics is thought to lie in the fact that they bypass the reproduction of the state as an intact and paramount entity of power. Micropolitics harness everyday lived and embodied experience as a vital matter of political struggles which aim to reinvigorate civil society, that is, the struggles of associations of people which develop outside of state institutions (Warner, 2002). However, seen historically, since the 1980s micropolitics have increasingly become integral to the effective realization of neoliberal governance. This is because this mode of engagement is aligned with transformations which have occurred at the level of the state. The neoliberal state is not a monolithic container, rather it disseminates into the most remote terrains of everyday experience. The dismantling of welfare systems has accelerated, and finally consolidated, the state’s withdrawal from the traditional role of centralized organizer of society. However, the result has not been the disappearance of the state itself, rather we are witnessing the disappearance of the welfare state and the emergence of new one (Fairbrother & Rainnie, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Social control is primarily performed through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individual existence: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your living-room. In this process, embodied subjectification and micropolitics have become necessary elements for the functioning of the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state needs, more than self-regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation (Marazzi, 1998; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). Hence, although they arose as an attempt to challenge the overly narrow focus on the state, micropolitics have played a vital role in shifting the historical function of the state from centralized control into a disseminated form of control which operates effectively in the terrain of social and cultural life. In this sense, both state- and micropolitics articulate their political agenda inside the terrain of the state and affirm its function and centrality in social life. This is the moment where embodied subjectification and the broader project of critical psychology amplify the production of affirmative subjectivity, a subjectivity which paradoxically solidifies state regulation by operating at its margins. However, the generation of affirmative subjectivity is more than a form of political regulation in contemporary North-Atlantic societies. It is also a productive force in the literal sense. The traditional apparatus for measuring and diagnosing individual differences was insufficient as a response to the social and economical transformations related to post-Fordist labour (Bowring, 2002; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2002; Moulier Boutang, 2003; Williams, 1994). This is because post-Fordism appropriates as productive resources precisely these forms of individual action and experience, which refer to the totality of individual subjectivity: relationality, emotions, memory, communication, creativity and primarily, the totality of the body. Critical psychology’s conceptualization captures the core tenet of the post-Fordist transformation in a magnificent way: embodied subjectification becomes the algorithm for the realization of the process of the ‘subjectivization of work’, a process which lies in the heart of post-Fordist productivity (Lohr & Nickel, 2005; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; Scho¨nberger & Springer, 2003). Yet critical psychology neither traces possible ruptures in the post-Fordist arrangement nor explores everyday forms of exodus and disobedience (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Virno, 2004). In other words, the critical psychological view of subjectification can elucidate, or diagnose, the productive role of the psychology in the social earthquake which accompanied the post-Fordist reorganization of labour and everyday sociality in North-Atlantic societies (Gordo-Lo´pez & Pujol Tarre´s, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2004). However, critical psychology is unable to engage with the suppressed potentialities of post-Fordist social relations which could lead to forms of political engagement that question post-Fordism itself (Karakayali & Tsianos, 2005; Negri, 1999; Santos, 2001; Stephenson, 2004). The reason for this is, as I argued above, that embodied subjectification is the core productive form of today’s sociality. Embodied subjectification is not only a heuristic tool which enables social researchers to understand power relations in post-Fordist North-Atlantic societies, but also the very guarantor of what Weber (1978) calls ‘legitimate domination’. A form of domination which is actively and willingly performed differently by each individual and congeals a form of power, which, following Hannah Arendt (1970), emerges not as a means to dominate but by the very fact that people act together. Embodied subjectification (and its very theoreticization by governmentality studies) is a form of obedience to today’s configuration of power in North-Atlantic societies. In this sense, micropolitics and embodied subjectification constitute a form of affirmative subjectivity in neoliberal and post-Fordist conditions. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly discuss Jacques Rancie`re’s concept of politics as a means for interfering in the production of affirmative subjectivity (for a more broad discussion of this issue s. Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

#### Non-escape’s cathartic break in black consciousness is retreat from practical transformation in favor of metaphysical maxims – only political hope like Fannie Lou Hamer’s party politics can renew psychic energy in struggle while bringing material improvements in infrastructure like water, housing, and education that require policy platforms – reverses battle fatigue thru intergenerational narratives of resistance

Stephens 17. RL. A. Philip Randolph Fellow at Jacobin. “Between the Black Body and Me.” Jacobin. https://jacobinmag.com/2017/05/ta-nehisi-coates-racism-afro-pessimism-reparations-class-struggle.

“I do not believe that we can stop them … because they must ultimately stop themselves,” Ta-Nehisi Coates says of white racists in the final paragraph of his bestseller Between the World and Me, written as an open letter to his son. Coates describes racism as galactic, a physical law of the universe, “a tenacious gravity” and a “cosmic injustice.”

When a cop kills a black man, the police officer is “a force of nature, the helpless agent of our world’s physical laws.” Society is equally helpless against the natural order. “The earthquake cannot be subpoenaed,” says Coates.

In a widely replicated gesture, Coates locates the experience of racism in the body, in a racism that “dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscle, extracts organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth.” In the slim volume, fewer than two hundred pages, the word “body” or “bodies” appears more than three hundred times. “In America,” he writes, “it is traditional to destroy the black body.” Another brooding passage dwells on the inevitability of this violence.

It had to be blood. It had to be nails driven through a tongue and ears pruned away. It had to be the thrashing of a kitchen maid for the crime of churning the butter at a leisurely clip. It could only be the employment of carriage whips, tongs, iron pokers, handsaws, stones, paperweights or whatever might be handy to break the black body.

Yet Coates’s descriptive language and haunting narrative are not mere metaphors. They act as a kind of ontological pivot, mystifying racism even as it is anchored in its physical effects.

Metaphor has long been used to capture racism’s almost unimaginable brutality. Lynching became “strange fruit” in Abel Meerpool’s song, made famous by Billie Holiday. In a wry, tragic innuendo, rape was referred to in Black communities as “nighttime integration.” The use of metaphor is not in itself an obfuscation. But Coates wields metaphor to obscure rather than illuminate the reality of racism.

What we find all too often in Coates’s narrative universe are bodies without life and a racism without people. To give race an ontological meaning, to make it a reality all its own, is to drain it of its place in history and its roots in discrete human action. To deny the role of life and people – of politics – as Coates does is to also foreclose the possibility of liberation.

No Helpless Agent

Ella knew her mother Liza’s unimaginable suffering, but her memory was not a yoke on her shoulders. It provoked something in Ella.

As an adult, she did not see the white predator stalking the fields as some helpless agent. She took matters into her own hands. There was no gravity strong enough to break her will or loosen her grip on her pistol. Her efforts rippled beyond those cotton fields.

Ella taught her own daughter, Fannie Lou Hamer, not only to struggle, but to resist.

Fannie Lou was born into a sharecropping family in rural Mississippi but would go on to become a beacon of the Civil Rights movement. She is best known for her work registering black voters in Mississippi, most famously during 1964’s Freedom Summer, at great personal risk.

Police arrested and beat her. White racists shot at her. Lyndon Johnson dismissed her as an illiterate. In 1973, an interviewer asked her, “Do you have faith that the system will ever work properly?” By then, Fannie Lou had seen a decade of setbacks and false dawns since first walking off her plantation in 1962 to fight for Civil Rights. She responded,

We have to make it work. Ain’t nothing going to be handed to you on a silver platter. That’s not just black people, that’s people in general, masses. See, I’m with the masses… You’ve got to fight. Every step of the way you’ve got to fight.

She marched. She sang freedom songs. She testified. She co-founded the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. For her, the logical solution was political: uniting a powerless many against a powerful few. White racists could be stopped. Black people could resist, and Fannie Lou and so many others did just that.

Fannie Lou knew that the wages of racism were measured on the body. “A black woman’s body was never hers alone,” she once remarked. White doctors sterilized her without her consent during a minor surgery, a barbaric intrusion so common she called it a “Mississippi appendectomy.” However, though she knew racism’s physical toll, she drew inspiration from stories of black resistance passed down orally across the generations. Hamer recalled her grandmother’s will to survive and her mother’s weapon of protection.

These intergenerational resistance narratives, according to Charles Cobb in his book This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed, “underlay a deep and powerful collective memory that was invisible to whites but greatly affected the shape and course of the modern Freedom Movement.” As a result, Fannie Lou and so many others possessed an intimate knowledge not only of their own human dignity, despite the racist brutality they endured, but also of the human frailty of their racial oppressors.

In the years before Fannie Lou’s political struggle began, whole communities, black women and men, rose up against the violence that was forced on black women’s bodies. Feminist historian Danielle McGuire argues this anti-rape community organizing in Alabama laid the foundation for what eventually became the Montgomery Bus Boycott. She observes, “The majority of leaders active in the Montgomery Improvement Association in 1955 cut their political teeth demanding justice for black women who were raped in the 1940s and early 1950s.”

Despite being a poor, black sharecropper drowning in the poverty and racial terror endemic to rural Mississippi, Fannie Lou held fast to her forbearers’ stories of resistance. She did not resign herself to fatalism, as Coates does.

The "Birthmark of Damnation"

Coates too takes a multigenerational view. Between the World and Me is framed as a letter to his son. However, rather than seeing a legacy of resistance, he finds a lineage of blackness defined by fear and dysfunction.

“When I was your age the only people I knew were black, and all of them were powerfully, adamantly, dangerously afraid,” he writes. “I felt the fear in the visits to my Nana’s home in Philadelphia,” Coates continues. “And I saw it in my own father.”

My father was so very afraid. I felt it in the sting of his black leather belt, which he applied with more anxiety than anger, my father who beat me as if someone might steal me away, because that is exactly what was happening all around us.

My father was so very afraid. I felt it in the sting of his black leather belt, which he applied with more anxiety than anger, my father who beat me as if someone might steal me away, because that is exactly what was happening all around us.

Coates describes his condition, and that of all black people, as a “birthmark of damnation.” The resistance stories passed down to Fannie Lou and so many others spurred them to march. Coates’s narrative, riddled with fear and futility, begs us to retreat.

Though Coates has never explicitly cited it as his theoretical framework, the dour outlook of his work evokes the themes of Afro-Pessimism. The pivot to the ontological that is apparent in Coates’s rhetoric is a hallmark of Afro-Pessimism.

“Ontology by definition is the study of being, and to speak of Blackness as an ontological condition means analyzing the state of Black bodies through the lens of slavery,” Afro-Pessimist scholar Michael Barlow, Jr., writes in the academic journal Inquiries. However, for Barlow, the relation of slavery that ontologically defines blackness is not a matter of political economy, but rather a “libidinal economy.”

In this telling, labor and ownership – that is, political economy – are merely incidental to racial slavery. Instead, it’s the white imagination and its depraved “metaphysical desires for Black flesh” that both predated and catalyzed racialized chattel slavery.

Racism is reduced to the spiritual, more a matter of a sinful nature than a political struggle. Coates has echoed this retreat to interiority, to the spiritual, to consciousness.

It’s the ontological pivot that leads Frank Wilderson, perhaps the world’s foremost Afro-Pessimist, to declare in his foundational text “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?” that black people are no more than cows in a slaughterhouse. Wilderson posits that “death of the black body is foundational to the life of American civil society,” just as a cow’s death is essential to the slaughterhouse.

Flippantly, Wilderson asks, “how would the cows fare under a dictatorship of the proletariat?” Coates adopts a similar sense of impotence. He characterizes struggle as aimless toil – an apolitical end in itself.

“The struggle is really all I have for you,” he tells his son, “because it is the only portion of this world under your control.” Yet how are we to struggle against earthquakes and physical laws? How can we fight gravity?

Both Coates and Wilderson speak of power in terms of dreams. Coates writes of monolithic white “Dreamers,” those whose investment in the American Dream requires a faith in their own whiteness.

Similarly, Wilderson sees America as enacting two distinct dreams. For Wilderson, “the dream of black accumulation and death” is separate from “the dream of worker exploitation.” Ultimately, in both Coates’s and Wilderson’s respective frameworks, solidarity is unimaginable and class struggle is rendered futile.

Though Coates does not go to the lengths Wilderson does to position himself in opposition to materialist politics, the result is effectively equivalent: a separation of race and class combined with a deep skepticism of class-based solidarity, reforms, or even revolution.

This is a turn away from the Freedom Tradition embodied by Fannie Lou Hamer. For her, the problem of racism wasn’t cosmology or ontology – it was an expression of politics implicated in class antagonism. Fannie Lou Hamer stood “with the masses,” both white and black. Solidarity through struggle from below, including class struggle, formed her path to victory.

Coates’s ontological pivot is more muddled than Wilderson’s. Fleetingly peppered throughout his work are allusions to material reality, betraying the imposition of metaphysical abstraction that ultimately drives his perspective. “We did not choose our fences,” he writes. “They were imposed on us by Virginia planters obsessed with enslaving as many Americans as possible.” Coates knows that Virginia planters did not invent gravity or earthquakes. Yet this historicizing impulse does not prevent him from essentializing racism when he confronts it head on.

In string of tweets from December 2016, Coates conceded that racism is not transcendental, noting that “at its very root it was always economic.” But acknowledging racism’s economic impact has not led him to embrace class struggle. Even Frank Wilderson can acknowledge that racism has an economic impact, but he still believes that class struggle and racism exist on distinct planes.

Coates holds a similar belief; that racism is wholly different in kind from class. In the same series of tweets, he concluded that “in America, ‘class’ isn’t the only kind of class.”

Just as he mystifies racism, even while locating its impact in the bodies of black people, here he again pivots. Coates cannot address material politics on its own terms, preferring instead to retreat to a contrived mystification. He replaces action with interiority.

As he recently told an auditorium of eager Northwestern students, “The process should not be… people looking out at the world and saying, ‘I would like for there to be change in the world, how do I do that?’” Instead, he implored the crowd to engage from the “inside-out, not outside-in… because if you are in the business of justice, and making this society more democratic, you might get a lot of disappointment.”

Consciousness matters, of course. “Baby you just got to love ’em,” Fannie Lou Hamer would say of the white segregationists who routinely threatened her life. “Hating just makes you sick and weak.” This was Hamer in a reflexive moment, but it was no retreat. In the very next breath, she warned, “I keep a shotgun in every corner of my bedroom and the first cracker even look like he wants to throw some dynamite on my porch won’t write his mama again.”

Fannie Lou truly was her mother’s daughter. Reflection, whether through intergenerational story or her own thoughts, enhanced her resistance.

The same cannot be said of Coates. Instead of finding relief in political action, Coates finds it in a cookout at Howard University’s homecoming, surrounded by black people. He fantasizes that he is “disappearing into all of their bodies,” as the music and dancing, the black cultural zeitgeist of the moment, cure him of the “birthmark of damnation.”

The curse is lifted. Blackness is transfigured, becoming a space “beyond the Dream.” It’s another ontological pivot, this time allowing Coates to conclude that The Mecca’s” – his term for Howard – cookout has a “power more gorgeous than any voting rights bill.”

It’s a fantasy of retreat, as if black culture were beyond the machinations of capitalism, as though black cultural expression existed in the world but was not of it and were enough to take us to a new one.

Between the World and Me concludes with Coates considering climate change. He sees climate change as a manifestation of a polluted white consciousness, rather than the unfettered excess of industrial capitalism. It is a “noose around the neck of the earth,” allegedly resulting in large part from white flight, the mid-century exodus of negrophobic white families to the suburbs and the pollution caused by the cars that took them there.

Coates’s words here are poetic but grossly inaccurate. They mimic Afro-Pessimism’s emphasis on the white libido, relegating his rhetoric to the realm of interior life, the souls of white folks, and stopping well short of the political domain.

For Coates, the Civil Rights movement was not a struggle to alter a material world; rather the “hope of the movement” was merely to “awaken the Dreamers.” Black politics is only relevant as far as it can arouse white consciousness, which he sees as a largely futile exercise, due to “the small chance of the Dreamers coming into consciousness.”

Coates sees common interest between the black elite and the black poor, as he marvels at “the entire diaspora,” from lawyers to street hustlers, present at Howard’s homecoming. Yet he cannot conceive of anti-capitalist class solidarity across racial identity. He has a darker vision, of a kind that Corey Robin has described as “apocalypticism.” Coates’s ultimate hope is not in collective human action, but rather the total annihilation of the world and all those living in it – another feature that unites him with Afro-Pessimism, which calls explicitly for the “end of the world.”

As he says of the Dreamers, “the field for their Dream, the stage where they have painted themselves white, is the deathbed of us all.” Paradoxically, though he can see a collective fate in apocalypse, he rejects shared struggle for liberation. “The Dreamers will have to learn to struggle themselves,” he declares.

The problem is, the whole of capitalist enterprise, both past and present, cannot be reduced to race as Original Sin. Left out of Coates’s mythology is the fact that colonial enterprise, in what would become the United States, relied first on European indentured servants, most of whom died within a handful of years after arriving on the continent.

It’s Coates’s reading of race as sin that pushes him to imagine a perverted form of salvation in the fantasy of apocalypse. In this racial fatalism, reparations for slavery emerges as the anticipation of the inevitable Judgement Day. It is therefore no surprise that Coates has taken up racial reparations as his cross to bear – not to change the world, but to condemn it.

A Moral Debt

For the better part of two years, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been the most visible and combative supporter of reparations in politics. Coates calls reparations “the indispensable tool against white supremacy.”

In 2016’s “My President Was Black” and “Better Is Good,” Coates refers to the “moral logic” of reparations. They are a measure that could atone for what he called in 2014’s “The Case for Reparations,” the “sin of national plunder.”

There he claimed that the nation owes a “moral debt” that must be remedied by the “spiritual renewal” that reparations would facilitate. Reparations for slavery is Coates’s ontological pivot fully realized.

These days, we find Coates touring prestigious universities and making his case for reparations in keynote addresses to packed auditoriums.

“I think every single one of these universities needs to make reparations,” Coates said to thunderous applause at a March 3 conference at Harvard University. The day-long conference, “Universities and Slavery: Bound By History,” began with Harvard’s president admitting that the university “was directly complicit in slavery from the college’s earliest days in the 17th century.”

Coates pushed the university to “use the language of reparation” as a measure that would “acknowledge that something was done.” Though Harvard acknowledged its history, no race-specific remedy was forthcoming.

Last fall, Georgetown did Harvard one better. They not only used the language of reparations; the school also put forward a program of financial and symbolic atonement. The university admitted to selling slaves in 1838, “a transaction that helped save Georgetown from financial ruin.”

In 2015 Georgetown convened a commission to “reflect upon our University’s history and involvement in the institution of slavery.” The commission recommended granting preferential admission for descendants of the 272 slaves the university sold two centuries ago, in addition to gestures like changing the names of campus buildings from those of slavemasters to those of slaves and free people of color.

Georgetown’s example is the closest actualization of reparations policy that has taken place during Coates’s three years of evangelizing. Coates said of the plan, “folks may not like the word ‘reparations,’ but it’s what Georgetown did. Scope is debatable. But it’s reparations.”

Coates wants “special acknowledgment” from above, in the service of spiritual renewal – which explains his penchant for means-tested trickle-down anti-racism. But if he had faith in “the masses,” as Fannie Lou Hamer did, he’d see that the renewal and acknowledgement he seeks comes from below, from class solidarity in the struggle for universal emancipation.

Harvard has a $37 billion endowment. Mere months before Coates’s appearance, dining workers at the school were locked in a protracted battle for a living wage. Many of these workers are themselves descendants of slaves, but the university was unmoved by their struggle. The dining workers spent the better part of a month on strike, before finally forcing Harvard to concede to their demands.

The university was quicker to take the less expensive measure of admitting that the school was complicit in seventeenth century slavery than it was to pay its workers fairly today.

I’m a former staffer for UNITE HERE, a hospitality union. Last year, I worked on a campaign in a multiethnic, multiracial university cafeteria in Chicago. The campaign’s primary demands were for wage increases and healthcare, using the slogan “Dignity and a Doctor.” Negotiations with the subcontractor had stalled, and strike preparations were under way. Pressures ran high. Workers were afraid. However, just as stories catalyzed resistance for Civil Rights leaders, stories anchored the worker organizing in our campaign.

Though workers’ struggles with poverty wages and a lack of health coverage were crucial, one story stood out above the others. Workers continually shared stories that their Chinese colleagues were being abused for speaking Chinese on the shop floor. Managers would walk past, and upon hearing Chinese, they’d smack the speaker on the back of the head commanding the worker to “speak English!”

Most of the workers were people of color, but the majority were not Chinese. The largest plurality in the workplace was made up of African-Americans, virtually all of whom only spoke English. But everyone could identify with the indignity of the story, the asymmetrical relations that empowered the bosses to abuse any one of them for any reason.

Workers from a whole range of identities fought in solidarity with the Chinese workers. Discrimination on the basis of language became a central demand in the broader campaign. The campaign attached the specificity of the Chinese workers’ situation to all the workers’ common struggle against the boss.

This form of class struggle was not enough to overcome racism the world over. But it did give a brief glimpse of solidarity across backgrounds and experiences through acknowledging the shared indignity of class exploitation.

In the end, the workers won. As the campaign victories were listed, the excitement in the room was overwhelming, a type of energy that I’d only ever felt at a particularly intense church service or while attending a high-stakes game in a packed stadium. The organizer announced that healthcare had been won. We clapped. We celebrated as the wage increases were added up.

But when the organizer revealed that the contract guaranteed the right to speak non-English languages in the workplace, the room erupted. The black workers were palpably just as invested as the Chinese workers, and everyone was ecstatic.

Because he fails to deeply consider what real, material resistance of the masses might look like, the kind that guided Fannie Lou Hamer, Coates ends up idealizing racism. He evokes metaphors of earthquakes and physical laws to describe its magnitude.

But for the workers in that university cafeteria, racism was a smack from a boss. For millions of poor black people, racism is the corrosive water pipes poisoning their bodies. School closures, crumbling and unstable housing, and all the intimately practical things necessary for everyday life are the measure of racism.

These racist realities are not separable from questions of class. In fact, they are expressions of class politics. The racialized tragedies faced daily by people of color require us to embrace class struggle, not Coates’s demobilizing metaphysical maxims about how white people “must ultimately stop themselves.”

Solidarity from below, between cafeteria workers, truck drivers, secretaries, and any number of everyday people is worth magnitudes more than the kind of special acknowledgement from elites that Coates is after. This solidarity through shared struggle, as Fannie Lou Hamer recognized, is the foundation for social transformation.

Where Coates would have us retreat, she called on us to march. She knew that the only way to defeat racism was to fight it, every step of the way.

#### Further, the AFF’s theory displaces material labor performed by Black women for a psycho-semiotic theory of the economy. That displaces Black struggle and determines the direction of their method.

Ebert 96, Prof in the College of Arts and Sciences @ University at Albany-State University of New York [Teresa L. received her Ph.D. at Minnesota, Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism, Preface]

One of the questions I ask in this book is why the dominant feminist theory in the postmodern moment-ludic feminism-has largely abandoned the problems of labor and exploitation and ignored their relation to gender, sexuality, difference, desire, and subjectivity. It has done so at a time when “two-thirds of all labour in the world is done by women…In the Free Production Zones in South-East Asia, Africa, and Latin America, more than 70 percent of the labour force is female[,]…the majority… young women (14-24)” who are highly exploited and underpaid (Mies 117). The other side of this question is what ludic feminist theory has substituted in place of the economic. How does it explain social relations and the emerging world reality? Most importantly, does this explanation make transformation of the social possible? Following Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, and other postructuralist theorists, ludic feminism, including much recent socialist feminism, has articulated the social as discourse/textuality and posited desire/pleasure as the dynamics of the social. In so doing, it has displaced economics, labor, and class struggle. The cost of this displacement has been enormous for feminist politics, especially for socialist feminism. This, then, is clearly a moment of crisis for revolutionary politics, specifically feminism. Stanley Aronowitz, in a long essay, declares that the “socialist movement deserves a decent burial” (“Situation” 58). Socialist feminists, like Michele Barrett, are abandoning Marxism and a socially transformative politics altogether, and turning instead to a discursive, cultural politics founded on the anti-Marxist writings of Michel Foucault and other ludic postmodern theorists. In the preface to her Politics of Truth, for instance, Barrett announces her anti-Marxism: “I am nailing my coulours to the mast of a more general post-Marxism” (vii). But as Renate Bridenthal points out in her review of Barrett, “[W]here is this ship sailing to? This is not a time for intellectuals to be sailing away in a sea of indeterminacy” (220). Under the pressure of the dominant discourses of Postmodernism, Marxism, and historical materialism are becoming lost revolutionary knowledges for the current generation of feminists. Now, in place of a historical materialist analysis for social change, feminists are provided with models for “the care of the self,” for “performing” and “rematophorizing” difference, for “power feminism,” and for “sexual-agency feminism,” all of which trivialize the situation of women: reducing it to matters of textuality, desire, or voluntarism. But Marxism continues to haunt these practices. Jacques Derrida (from whom all post-Marxists have learned the deconstruction of the social) has arrived at a very different relation to Marxism-after devoting most of his philosophical writing to occluding Marxist knowledges. He now contests the new global “*dominant* discourse” that “proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its practices” (*Specters* 51-52). Derrida declares, “Upon rereading the *[The Communist]* Manifesto and a few other great works of Marx…I know of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent today” (13). He goes on to claim that “It will always be a fault not to read and reread and discuss Marx…It will be more and more of a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, political responsibility” (13).

#### Neolib commoditizes life, ensures inequality, eco-crisis

Harvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171//shree)

To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity. Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guide––an ethic––for all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a curious penchant to pursue ‘corruption’ as if it is easily distinguishable from the normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example).¶ Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contract––marriage, for example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame ‘liberals’, ‘Hollywood’, or even ‘postmodernists’ for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term commitments in their endless pursuit of profit.¶ But there are far more serious issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, ‘are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious’. While capitalism cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:¶ To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of man’s labour power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.18¶ The damage wrought through the ‘floods and droughts’ of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyi’s final point. But his theses on labour and land deserve further elaboration.¶ Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as ‘human cap- ital’) and tastes (sometime referred to as ‘cultural capital’), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers’ advantage. Conversely, workers may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely construct- ing that ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ of which Polanyi speaks.¶ Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A ‘personal responsibility system’ (how apt Deng’s language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets.¶ The second prong of attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too much can be made of the ‘race to the bottom’ to find the cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they are exposed.¶ Under neoliberalization, the figure of ‘the disposable worker’ emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: ‘unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all’.20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows:¶ We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes––especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered––until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21¶ Similar tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse ‘in which 61 workers, locked in the building, died in a fire’ received a ‘lenient’ two-year suspended sentence because he had ‘showed repentance’ and ‘cooperated in the aftermath of the fire’.22¶ Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of women’s liberation from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved). The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of women’s rights through neoliberalization has been nothing short of catastrophic.¶ So how, then, do disposable workers––women in particular–– survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. ‘I shop therefore I am’ and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the world’s disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people condemned to live on less than $2 a day, the taunting world of capitalist consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the self-congratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization, privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the financial burdens of the poor.24

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

Chase-Dunn 99 (Chris, Christopher Chase-Dunn is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California-Riverside. He received his Ph.D in Sociology from Stanford University in 1975. Chase-Dunn has done crossnational quantitative studies of the effects of dependence on foreign investment and he studies cities and settlement systems in order to explain human sociocultural evolution. His research focuses on interpolity systems, including both the modern global political economy and earlier regional world-systems. One project examines the causes of the expansion and collapse of cities and empires in several regional world-systems as well as the contemporary process of global state formation. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation. Chase-Dunn is the founder and former editor of the Journal of World-Systems Research. and the Series Editor of a book series published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. In 2001 he was elected a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In 2002 he was elected President of the Research Committee on Economy and Society (RC02) of the International Sociological Association. And in 2008 he was elected Distinguished Senior Scholar of the International Political Economy (IPE) section of the International Studies Association. “Globalization: A World-Systems Perspective.” Journal of World-Systems Research, v2, summer, p 188-206//shree)

Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

### PIK – Ballot – 1NC

#### We endorse the reading of the 1AC, without their call for the ballot.

#### Voting negative endorses the 1AC as a good idea without their use of the ballot to delineate changes in community structure. Tokenization and icon-ification relies upon a fetishistic victim economy that assuages white, liberal guilt and devolves to black squares on Instagram – that reifies the worst tenets of neoliberalism

Fleishman 13 (Katie, PhD student in English at UC Berkeley, with an emphasis in Film & Media Studies, "The Female Complaint" April 28, <http://circleuncoiled.wordpress.com/2013/04/28/lauren-berlant-the-female-complaint/>) DR 16-edited GK 17

Everyone knows what the female complaint is: women live for love, and love is the gift that keeps on taking” 1. Popular culture“market[s] what is sensational about the complaint, speaking from a pretense to skewer an open secret that has been opened and skewered, in US culture, since at least the 1830s. Fusing feminine rage and feminist rage, each has its own style of hailing the wounded to testify, to judge, to yearn, and to think beyond the norms of sexual difference, a little… [they] foreground witnessing witnessing and explaining women’s disappointment… they are also sentimental, and therefore ambivalent: they trust affective knowledge and irrational assurance more than truths of any ideology; they associate femininity with the pleasures, burdens, and virtues of emotional expertise and track its methods in different situations; they focus on the sacrifice of women’s emotional labor to a variety of kinds of callousness, incompetence, and structural inequity; they catalog strategies of bargaining, adaptation, and flouting the rules. But in popular culture ambivalence is seen as the failure of a relation, the opposite of happiness, rather than as an inevitable condition of intimate attachment and a pleasure in its own right”1. The “thrilling encounter with pleasure, foreboding, and disappointment familiar to fans of the soap opera and the melodrama” might be placed on a spectrum with the type personality of the sitcom 2. “Complaint genres” blame “flawed men and bad ideologies” for “women’s intimate suffering,” but also “maintain some fidelity to the world of distinction and desire that produced such disappointment in the first place” 2. This is a “vigilance” in “recording how other women manage” – “a space of disappointment, not disenchantment” 2. The sentimentality lies in the American “love affair with conventionality,” as well as with the “tomorrow is another day” attitude that demonstrates a “confidence in the critical intelligence of affect, emotion, and good intention… agency that is focused on ongoing adaptation… transcending the world as it presents itself” 2. Such “permission to thrive” constitutes “permission to live small but to feel large; to live large but to want what is normal too; to be critical without detaching from disappointing and dangerous worlds and objects of desire… the aesthetically expressed desire to be somebody in a world where the default is being nobody” 3. “Thus to love conventionality is not only to love something that constrains someone or some condition of possibility: it is another way of talking about negotiating belonging to a world. To love a thing is not only to embrace its most banal iconic forms, but to work those forms so that individuals and populations can breathe and thrive in them or in proximity to them. The convention is not only a mere placeholder for what could be richer in an underdeveloped social imaginary, but it is also sometimes a profound placeholder that provides an affective confirmation of the idea of a shared confirming imaginary in advance of inhabiting a material world in which that feeling can actually be lived. In popular culture, when conventionality is not being called a homogenizing threat to people’s sovereignty and singularity it is seen as a true expression of something both deep and simple in the human… I span the term’s normative and aesthetic senses and claim that the **mass mediation** of desires in women’s genres constructs a deep affinity between them” 3. A genre “mediates what is singular, in the details, and general about the subject. It is a form of **aesthetic expectation** with porous boundaries allowing **complex audience identifications**: it locates real life in the **affective capacity** to **bracket** many kinds of **structural and historical antagonism** on behalf of finding a way to connect with the **feeling of belonging** to a larger world, however aesthetically mediated” 4. “To call an identity like a sexual identity a genre is to think about it as something repeated, detailed, and stretched while retaining its intelligibility, its capacity to remain readable or audible across the field of all its variations. For femininity **to be a genre** like an aesthetic one **means that** **it is** **a structure of conventional expectation** **that people rely on to provide certain kinds of affective intensities and assurances**” 4. Importantly, for Berlant, this means that ‘performativity’ often means variations within convention, rahter than “dramas of potentially frame-breaking alternativity” 4. The swerves a genre takes as “transgressions” on the way to the ultimate end are often part of the convention: “women’s culture always contains episodes of refusal and creative contravention to feminine normativity, even as it holds tightly to some versions of the imaginable conventional good life in love” 4. “**The** gender-marked **texts of** women’s popular culture cultivate **fantasies of vague belonging as an alleviation of** what is hard to manage in the lived real – **social antagonisms, exploitation**, compromised intimacies, the attrition of life… **one of the main utopias is normativity** itself… **an aspirational site of** rest and **recognition in and by a social world**” 5. “An intimate public operates when a market opens up to a bloc of consumers, claiming to circulate texts and things that express those people’s particular core interests and desires… participants… feel as though it expresses what is common among them, a subjective likeness that seems to emanate from their history and their ongoing attachments and actions… seems to confirm the sense that even before there was a market addressed to them, there existed a world of strangers who would be **emotionally literate in each other’s experience of power**, intimacy, desire, **and discontent**, with all that entails… ‘**Women’s culture’ was the first such mass-marketed intimate public** in the United States of significant scale” 5. “As long as they have had a public sphere, **bourgeois white women** writers have **mobilized fantasies of what black and working-class interiority based on suffering must feel like in order to find a language for their own** more privileged **suffering** at the hands of other women, men, and callous institutions [The Help!]… **Compassionate liberalism** **is**, at best, a kind of **sandpaper** on the surface of the racist monument **whose structural** and economic **solidity** **endures**: **in the intimate sphere** of femininity **a** kind of **soft supremacy rooted in compassion and coercive identification** wants to dissolve all that structure… while **busily** **exoticizing and diminishing the inconvenient and the noncompliant**… But… intimate spheres feel like ethical places…” 6. [vs Mad Men?] “**The problem** at hand **is of naming what appears when a collectivity is historically created by biopower, class antagonism, nationalism, imperialism, and/or the law and**, at the same time, is **engendered by an ongoing social life mediated by capital and organized by** all kinds of **pleasure**… **Intimate publics elaborate themselves through a commodity culture**; have an osmotic relation to many modes of life; **and are organized by fantasies of transcending**” 8. “Biopower has indeed reorganized individuals into populations deemed incompetent to the privileges of citizenship… fields of historical commonality that are at once specifically related to events… and to what it was like back in the day” 9. “**A public is intimate** **when** it foregrounds **affective** and **emotional attachments** **located in fantasies of the common, the everyday, and a sense of ordinariness**, a space where the social world is **rich** **with** anonymity and **local recognitions**… textually mediated: as Miriam Hansen has argued, modern publics required stylistic strategies and **modes of narration to absorb viewers into textually constructed positions of general subjectivity that also serve**d **the historical convergence of social and economic objectives** [think Williams and **the code and** Mulvey and **the gaze**]…. in mass society, **what counts as collectivity has been a** loosely organized, **market-structured juxtapolitical sphere of people attached to each other by a sense that there is a common emotional world available** **to those** individuals who have been **marked by the historical burden of being harshly treated in a generic way**… **a sense of** lateral **identification**… revelations of what is personal, regardless of how what is persona has itself been threaded through mediating institutions and social hierarchy” 10 [think faceting!] “Mass-mediated **popular culture is always generating more opportunities for fomenting a sense of focused belonging to an evolving world in this intensely connected yet mediated way**… **Belonging to an intimate public is therefore** a condition of feeling general within a set of porous constraints, and of **feeling held or sustained by an evolving sense of experience that confirms some homogeneity** and elaborates social distinctions” 13. Disappointment and fulfillment are “partners” in the culture of women and love: “Each is central to the absorbing anxiety that gets animated by having an object oAf desire” 13. In Lacanian terms, “the loss of pleasure, then, can be defined as the insufferable interruption of a repetition with which a lover has identified the optimism of a fundamental attachment” 14. “Love is the gift that keeps on giving when people can rely on reexperiencing their intimates’ fundamental sympathy with the project of repetition and recognition [importance of ‘tomorrow’]… Love is the gift that keeps on taking for the same reason: the search for mirroring (desire) demands constant improvisation (anxiety) and taking of accounts (disappointment)” 15. When a success, this is called reciprocity. For Jacqueline Rose, “anxiety is the core affect of femininity, which operates under an imperative never to fail to stop working on itself” 16. “In women’s culture, normative femininity and aesthetic conventionality constitute the real central couple, with the love plot as the vehicle for and object of desire. Spivak’s description of the ‘concept/metaphor’ that is simultaneously descriptive and transformative is useful here… for not changing, but adapting, propping the play of surface against a stubborn demand to remain in proximity to the promise” 19. “For a woman committed to romantic fantasies of love as reciprocity to break with the normative emotional bargains is to threaten her participation in the good life that seems to unfold from desire and to be maintained by ordinary emotional labor. The sentimental bargain of femininity… receives her own value back not only in the labor of recognition she performs but in the sensual spectacle of its impacts. In this discursive field the emotional labor of women places them at the center of the story of what counts as life, regardless of what lives women actually live: the conjuncture of family and romance so structures the emergence of modern sexuality, with its conflation of sexual and emotional truths, and in that nexus femininity marks the scene of the reproduction of life as a project… to be proximate to this story of emotional centrality. The circularity of the feminine project… is a perfect form, a sphere infused with activities of ongoing circuits of attachment that can at the same time look and feel like a zero” 19. [think Joan Holloway Harris] “The mechanism of sentimental saturation of the intimate sphere with materials and signs of consumer citizenship has been crucial to what Mark Seltzer has called the ‘pathological public sphere’ of the contemporary US… the sensationalism of the late 19th and early 20th century. The Uncle Tom genealogy is notable precisely because its sensationalism was a politically powerful suturing device of a bourgeois revolutionary aesthetic” 20. f consumer citizenship has been crucial to what Mark Seltzer has called the ‘pathological public sphere’ of the contemporary US… the sensationalism of the late 19th and early 20th century. The Uncle Tom genealogy is notable precisely because its sensationalism was a politically powerful suturing device of a bourgeois revolutionary aesthetic” 20.

## Case

### AFF DS – 1NC

#### Their corporeal focus is bad – the first piece of Terrefe evidence says that Black womanhood is structured in the id, which the AFF doesn’t solve:

#### A – Their advocacy statement refers to navigating intergenerational trauma as a Black woman. A white judge agreeing to the benefits of a Black collective unconscious does not change the effectiveness of movements, nor does it change BK’s unconscious.

#### B – The King evidence – advocates for investigation of Black female sexuality – obviously non-Black debaters and judges engaging in that is fucked.

#### C – No enforcement mechanism – psychoanalysis is introspective, no way to actualize it through debate.

#### D – Pornotroping false – if it’s true, AFF makes it worse.

Tamura A. **Lomax 11**. Doctoral Student in Religion, Vanderbilt. Hortense Spillers served on Lomax’s doctoral committee. “Changing the Letter: Theorizing Race and Gender in Pop Cultural ‘Media’ Through a Less Pornotropic Lens.” Dissertation. May. http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-03282011-101108/unrestricted/LomaxDissertatonFull.pdf.

However, it is important to note that while black women and girls are impacted by superimposed pornotropic ways of being seen, a distinction is to be drawn between identities as produced by others and identities as appropriated and performed by black women and girls themselves. Therefore, although identities are superimposed onto black women and girls’ bodies, they are always contested and appropriated. Despite contestation and appropriation, culturally produced and maintained ideas about identities are also so hegemonicly determined that they appear normative and are thus internalized. Although the pornotropic gaze may be internalized, simultaneously operating may also be their contestations, notwithstanding how difficult resistance to pornotropic gazing may be, particularly as they are intermeshed with reality and as such, difficult to resist altogether.¶ Exploring the pornotropic gaze and its determinacy within contemporary black religion 12 and cultural media 13 is the major aim of this dissertation. Womanist theologians and ethicists created a cross-pollinated theo-ethical trajectory that demarginalized and re-presented North American black women as thinking and feeling moral agents with experiences worthy of academic inquiry. Pivotal to their discourse is demythologizing black womanhood and its variety of cultural representations. However, a major proposition circulating throughout this dissertation is that, while womanist theoethical discourse opens space for examining North American black women’s experiences and representations, what is needed to move that discourse forward in African American Religion14 from its dependencies on restricted analyses of black women’s experiences, methodological limitations and normative conceptual restrictions, is an examination of the manner in which the force of representational epistemes operate in black religion and culture to over-determine contemporary black women and girls’ experiences within a pornotropic gaze.¶ This dissertation argues that religious and cultural media are socially organized technologies of power that reproduce, maintain, circulate, and exchange historical myths on black womanhood, which black women and girls both resist and appropriate. 15 Notwithstanding how they may be resisted or appropriated, operative historical myths need to be deconstructed and, in many cases, disoriented. This dissertation achieves this by “changing the letter.” “Changing the letter,” which refers to the essay, “Changing the Letter: The Yokes, the Jokes of Discourse, or, Mrs. Stowe, Mr. Reed,” written by Spillers, frames both my theory and strategy for reading (deconstruction) and writing (retheorizing). It holds that words (“letters”) can be manipulated (“changed”) in a variety of ways to tell a story that may be either liberative or oppressive (“yoke”). Therefore, meanings are not fixed, 16 but are constantly influx, although sometimes appearing stabilized.¶ This dissertation takes issue with the latter perception: the ways that cultural meanings are stabilized over time and presented as “truth.” 17 Pornotropia 18 thrives off of controlling ideas that are stabilized and taken for granted. The phrase, “taken for granted,” highlights what Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann refer to as un-reflected inclinations toward certain actions developed in the ‘natural attitude’, which presume inter-subjective realities of the life-world to be similarly experienced or imagined, for example, the idea that there was a world prior to our existence, made up of subjects, objects and nature, the former of which (human subjects) are endowed with consciousnesses that interpret meanings amongst themselves in horizontal and cognitive ways. However, “reality,” the conditions that we encounter, is mediated through interpretation, which gives rise to certain kinds of conduct (over others), given our stock of previous experiences, either our own or inherited. Previous experiences frame our “stocks of knowledge” and motivate our attitudes and actions toward certain ends, given the anticipation of what is believed to be both conventional and probable. 19¶ The “taken for granted” within the ‘natural attitude’ neglects critical queries that might take up how relationships between the subject and representation might be situated, or, as interpreters, how we may be positioned towards either (or both), given attitudes. This kind of thinking leads to reductive practices such as reading one’s identity in light of the appearance of a (projected) profile such as the taken for granted “black-female-aswhore” stereotype, as opposed to her complex subjectivity. The latter enables a variety of readings, thus “lessening” pornotropia, which depends on the rigidity of a closed script.¶ This dissertation highlights a struggle for truth that is inextricably linked to lived experiences, that is, social-cultural-historical-political conditions. One aim of this dissertation is to confuse previous readings of “black womanhood” by blasting the habits of language, linguistic and representational, its internal signals, inferred ideologies, encodings, and operation. These strategies enable the mass-reproduction and continued circulation and closure of the script of black womanhood. Circulating myths of black womanhood need to be taken up. However, they also need to be taken up differently than they have been previously in African American religion, culture, and womanist theoethical scholarship. This dissertation explores their deployment in religion and culture and the critiques thereof. Both deployment and criticisms produce layers of meanings that are reproduced and circulated. I will examine the strategies by which myths of black womanhood travel, getting realigned and re-appropriated from generation to generation.¶ These moves “loosen the yoke” and decrease the jolts of “America’s Grammar Book” on race and gender. The following chapters emphasize loosening the yoke, while the overall aim of this dissertation is significantly inspired by the reality of the jolt. “The jolt” refers to the ongoing threat of symbolic and material violence caused by day-to-day representational terror, which is mass-produced in and transmitted through media that “projects”20 and inform certain opinions and attitudes regarding ‘normativity’ and ‘difference’.

### No Symbolic Order – 1NC

#### There is no single symbolic order or collective unconscious.

Nancy **FRASER** Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School **’13** *Fortunes of Feminism* p. 140-149

1. W H A T DOFEMIN ISTS W AN T IN A D ISCO U R SE TH EO RY?

Let me begin by posing two questions: What might a theory of discourse contribute to feminism? And what, therefore, should feminists look for in a theory of discourse? I suggest that a conception of discourse can help us understand at least four things, all of which are interrelated. First, it can help us understand how people’s social identities are fashioned and altered over time. Second, it can help us understand how, under conditions of inequality, social groups in the sense of collective agents are formed and unformed. Third, a conception of discourse can illuminate how the cultural hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and contested. Fourth and finally, it can shed light on the prospects for emancipatory social change and political practice. Let me elaborate.

First, consider the uses of a conception of discourse for understanding social identities. The basic idea here is that people s social identities are complexes of meanings, networks of interpretation. To have a social identity, to be a woman or a man, for example, just is to live and to act under a set of descriptions. These descriptions, of course, are not simply secreted by peoples’s bodies; nor are they simply exuded by people s psyches. Rather, they are drawn from the fund of interpretive possibilities available to agents in specific societies. It follows that, in order to understand the gender dimension of social identity, it does not suffice to study biology or psychology. Instead, one must study the historically specific social practices through which cultural descriptions of gender are produced and circulated.3

Moreover, social identities are exceedingly complex. They are knitted together from a plurality of different descriptions arising from a plurality of different signifying practices. Thus, no one is simply a woman; one is rather, for example, a white, Jewish, middle-class woman, a philosopher, a lesbian, a socialist, and a mother.4 Because everyone acts in a plurality of social contexts, moreover, the different descriptions comprising any individuals social identity fade in and out of focus. Thus, one is not always a woman in the same degree; in some contexts, ones womanhood figures centrally in the set of descriptions under which one acts; in others, it is peripheral or latent.5 Finally, it is not the case that peoples social identities are constructed once and for all and definitively fixed. Rather, they alter over time, shifting with shifts in agents’ practices and affiliations. Even the way in which one is a woman will shift— as it does, to take a dramatic example-, when one becomes a feminist. In short, social identities are discursively constructed in historically specific social contexts; they are complex and plural; and they shift over time. One use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing, then, is in understanding social identities in their full socio-cultural complexity, thus in demystifying static, single variable, essentialist views of gender identity.

A second use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing is in understanding the formation of social groups. How does it happen, under conditions of domination, that people come together, arrange themselves under the banner of collective identities, and constitute themselves as collective social agents? How do class formation and, by analogy, gender formation occur?

Clearly, group formation involves shifts in people s social identities and therefore also in their relation to social discourse. One thing that happens here is that pre-existing strands of identities acquire a new sort of salience and centrality. These strands, previously submerged among many others, are reinscribed as the nub of new self-definitions and affiliations.6 For example, in the current wave of feminist ferment, many of us who had previously been “ women” in some taken-for-granted way have now become “ women” in the very different sense of a discursively self-constituted political collectivity. In the process, we have remade entire regions of social discourse. We have invented new terms for describing social reality— for example, “ sexism,” “ sexual harassment,” “ marital, date, and acquaintance rape,” “ labor force sex-segregation,” “ the double shift,” and “ wife-battery.” We have also invented new language games such as consciousness raising and new, institutionalized public spheres such as the Society for Women in Philosophy.7 The point is that the formation of social groups proceeds by struggles over social discourse. Thus, a conception of discourse is useful here, both for understanding group formation and for coming to grips with the closely related issue of socio-cultural hegemony.

“ Hegemony” is the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci s term for the discursive face of power. It is the power to establish the “ common sense” or “ doxa” of a society, the fund of self-evident descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying.8 This includes the power to establish authoritative definitions of social situations and social needs, the power to define the universe of legitimate disagreement, and the power to shape the political agenda. Hegemony, then, expresses the advantaged position of dominant social groups with respect to discourse. It is a concept that allows us to recast the issues of social identity and social groups in the light of societal inequality. How do pervasive axes of dominance and subordination affect the production and circulation of social meanings? How does stratification along lines of gender, “ race,” and class affect the discursive construction of social identities and the formation of social groups? T h e notion of hegemony points to the intersection of power, inequality, and discourse. However, it does not entail that the ensemble of descriptions that circulate in society comprise a monolithic and seamless web, nor that dominant groups exercise an absolute, topdown control of meaning. On the contrary, “ hegemony” designates a process wherein cultural authority is negotiated and contested. It presupposes that societies contain a plurality of discourses and discursive sites, a plurality of positions and perspectives from which to speak. Of course, not all of these have equal authority. Yet conflict and contestation are part of the story. Thus, one use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing is to shed light on the processes by which the socio-cultural hegemony of dominant groups is achieved and contested. What are the processes by which definitions and interpretations inimical to w om en s interests acquire cultural authority? What are the prospects for mobilizing counter-hegemonic feminist definitions and interpretations to create broad oppositional groups and alliances?

The link between these questions and emancipatory political practice is, I believe, fairly obvious. A conception of discourse that lets us examine identities, groups, and hegemony in the ways I have been describing would be of considerable use to feminist practice. It would valorize the empowering dimensions of discursive struggles without leading to “culturalist” retreats from political engagement.9 In addition, the right kind of conception would counter the disabling assumption that women are just passive victims of male dominance. That assumption over-totalizes male dominance, treating men as the only social agents- and rendering inconceivable our own existence as feminist theorists and activists. In contrast, the sort of conception I have been proposing would help us understand how, even under conditions of subordination, women participate in the making of culture.

2. LACANIANISM AND THE LIMITS OF STRU CTU RA LISM

In light of the foregoing, what sort of conception of discourse will be useful for feminist theorizing? What sort of conception best illuminates social identities, group formation, hegemony, and emancipatory practice?

In the postwar period, two approaches to theorizing language became influential among political theorists. The first is the structuralist model, which studies language as a symbolic system or code. Derived from Saussure, this model is presupposed in the version of Lacanian theory I shall be concerned with here; in addition, it is abstractly negated but not entirely superseded in deconstruction and in related forms of French “ womens writing.” The second influential approach to theorizing language may be called the pragmatics model, which studies language at the level of discourses, as historically specific social practices of communication. Espoused by such thinkers as Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, this model is operative in some but not all dimensions of the work of Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. In the present section of this chapter, I shall argue that the first, structuralist model is of only limited usefulness for feminist theorizing.

Let me begin by noting that there are good prima facie reasons for feminists to be suspicious of the structuralist model. This model constructs its object of study by abstracting from exactly what we need to focus on, namely, the social practice and social context of communication. Indeed, the abstraction from practice and context are among the founding gestures of Saussurean linguistics. Saussure began by splitting signification into langue, the symbolic system or code, and parole, speakers’ uses of language in communicative practice or speech. He then made the first of these, langue, the proper object of the new science of linguistics, and relegated the second, parole, to the status of a devalued remainder.10 At the same time, Saussure insisted that the study of langue be synchronic rather than diachronic; he thereby posited his object of study as static and atemporal, abstracting it from historical change. Finally, the founder of structuralist linguistics posited that langue was indeed a single system; he made its unity and systematicity consist in the putative fact that every signifier, every material, signifying element of the code, derives its meaning positionally through its difference from all of the others.

Together, these founding operations render the structuralist approach of limited utility for feminist purposes." Because it abstracts from parole, the structuralist model brackets questions of practice, agency, and the speaking subject. Thus, it cannot shed light on the discursive practices through which social identities and social groups are formed. Because this approach brackets the diachronic, moreover, it will not tell us anything about shifts in identities and affiliations over time. Similarly, because it abstracts from the social context of communication, the model brackets issues of power and inequality. Thus, it cannot illuminate the processes by which cultural hegemony is secured and contested. Finally, because the model theorizes the fund of available linguistic meanings as a single symbolic system, it lends itself to a monolithic v iew of signification that denies tensions and contradictions among social meanings. In short, by reducing discourse to a “ symbolic system," the structuralist model evacuates social agency, social conflict, and social practice.12

Let me now try to illustrate these problems by means of a brief discussion of Lacanianism. B y “ Lacanianism," I do not mean the actual thought of Jacques Lacan, which is far too complex to tackle here. I mean, rather, an ideal-typical neo-structuralist reading of Lacan that is widely credited among English-speaking feminists.'5 In discussing “ Lacanianism,” I shall bracket the question of the fidelity of this reading, which could be faulted for overemphasizing the influence of Saussure at the expense of other, countervailing influences, such as Hegel.'4 For my purposes, however, this ideal-typical, Saussurean reading of Lacan is useful precisely because it evinces with unusual clarity the difficulties that beset many conceptions of discourse that are widely considered “ poststructuralist” but that remain wedded in important respects to structuralism. Because their attempts to break free of structuralism remain abstract, such conceptions tend finally to recycle it. Lacanianism, as discussed here, is a paradigm case of “ neostructuralism.” '5

At first sight, neo-structuralist Lacanianism seems to promise some advantages for feminist theorizing. B y conjoining the Freudian problematic of the construction of gendered subjectivity to the Saussurean model of structural linguistics, it seems to provide each with its needed corrective. The introduction of the Freudian problematic promises to supply the speaking subject that is missing in Saussure and thereby to reopen the excluded questions about identity, speech, and social practice. Conversely, the use of the Saussurean model promises to remedy some of Freuds deficiencies. By insisting that gender identity is discursively constructed, Lacanianism appears to eliminate lingering vestiges of biologism in Freud, to treat gender as sociocultural all the way down, and to render it in principle more open to change.

Upon closer inspection, however, the promised advantages fail to materialize. Instead, Lacanianism begins to look viciously circular. On the one hand, it purports to describe the process by which individuals acquire gendered subjectivity through their painful conscription as young children into a pre-existing phallocentric symbolic order. Here the structure of the symbolic order is presumed to determine the character of individual subjectivity. But, on the other hand, the theory also purports to show that the symbolic order must necessarily be phallocentric since the attainment of subjectivity requires submission to “ the Father s Law.” Here, conversely, the nature of individual subjectivity, as dictated by an autonomous psychology, is presumed to determine the character of the symbolic order.

One result of this circularity is an apparently ironclad determinism. As Dorothy Leland has noted, the theory casts the developments it describes as necessary, invariant, and unalterable.16 Phallocentrism, womans disadvantaged place in the symbolic order, the encoding of cultural authority as masculine, the impossibility of describing a nonphallic sexuality— in short, any number of historically contingent trappings of male dominance— now appear as invariable features of the human condition. Womens subordination, then, is inscribed as the inevitable destiny of civilization.

I can spot several spurious steps in this reasoning, some of which have their roots in the presupposition of the structuralist model. First, to the degree Lacanianism has succeeded in eliminating biologism— and that is dubious for reasons I shall not go into here17 — it has replaced it with psychologism, the untenable view that autonomous psychological imperatives given independently of culture and history can dictate the way they are interpreted and acted on within culture and history.

FOOTNOTE 17 INSERTED

17 Here I believe one can properly speak of Lacan. Lacans claim to have overcome biologism rests on his insistence that the phallus is not the penis. However, many feminist critics have shown that he fails to prevent the collapse of the symbolic signifier into the organ. The clearest indication of this failure is his claim, in The Meaning of the Phallus,” that the phallus becomes the master signifier because of its “ turgidity” which suggests “ the transmission of vital flow” in copulation. See Jacques Lacan, “ T h e Meaning of the Phallus,” in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecole freudienne, eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, N ew York: W.W. N orton & Company, 1982.

END FOOTNOTE 17

Lacanianism falls prey to psychologism to the extent that it claims that the phallocentricity of the symbolic order is required by the demands of an enculturation process that is itself independent of culture.18

I f one h a lf of Lacanianism s circular argument is vitiated by psychologism, then the other half is vitiated by what I shall call symbolicism. B y symbolicism I mean, first, the homogenizing reification of diverse signifying practices into a monolithic and all-pervasive “ symbolic order,” and second, the endowing of that order with an exclusive and unlimited causal power tofix people s subjectivities once and for all. Symbolicism, then, is an operation whereby the structuralist abstraction langue is troped into a quasi-divinity, a normative “ symbolic order” whose power to shape identities dwarfs to the point of extinction that of mere historical institutions and practices.

Actually, as Deborah Cameron has noted, Lacan himself equivocates on the expression “ the symbolic order.” '9 Sometimes he uses this expression relatively narrowly to refer to Saussurean langue, the structure of language as a system of signs. In this narrow usage, Lacanianism would be committed to the implausible view that the sign system itself determines individuals’ subjectivities independently of the social context and social practice of its uses. At other times, Lacan uses the expression “ the symbolic order” far more broadly to refer to an amalgam that includes not only linguistic structures, but also cultural traditions and kinship structures, the latter mistakenly equated with social structure in general.20 In this broad usage, Lacanianism would conflate the ahistorical structural abstraction langue with variable historical phenomena like family forms and childrearing practices; cultural representations of love and authority in art, literature, and philosophy; the gender division of labor; forms of political organization and of other institutional sources of power and status. The result would be a conception of “ the symbolic order” that essentializes and homogenizes contingent historical practices and traditions, erasing tensions, contradictions, and possibilities for change. This would be a conception, moreover, that is so broad that the claim that it determines the structure of subjectivity risks collapsing into an empty tautology.21

The combination of psychologism and symbolicism in Lacanianism results in a conception of discourse that is of limited usefulness for feminist theorizing. To be sure, this conception offers an account of the discursive construction of social identity. However, it is not an account that can make sense of the complexity and multiplicity of social identities, the ways they are woven from a plurality of discursive strands. Granted, Lacanianism stresses that the apparent unity and simplicity of ego identity is imaginary, that the subject is irreparably split both by language and drives. B ut this insistence on fracture does not lead to an appreciation of the diversity of the socio-cultural discursive practices from which identities are woven. It leads, rather, to a unitary v iew of the human condition as inherently tragic. In fact, Lacanianism differentiates identities only in binary terms, along the single axis of having or lacking the phallus. As Luce Irigaray has shown, this phallic conception of sexual difference is not an adequate basis for understanding femininity22— nor, I would add, masculinity. Still less, then, is it able to shed light on other dimensions of social identities, including ethnicity, color, and social class. Nor could the theory be emended to incorporate these manifestly historical phenomena, given its postulation of an ahistorical, tension-free “ symbolic order” equated with kinship.23

Moreover, Lacanianism’s account of identity construction cannot account for identity shifts over time. It is committed to the general psychoanalytic proposition that gender identity (the only kind of identity it considers) is basically fixed once and for all with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Lacanianism equates this resolution with the child’s entry into a fixed, monolithic, and all-powerful symbolic order. Thus, it actually increases the degree of identity fixity found in classical Freudian theory. It is true, as Jacqueline R o se points out, that the theory stresses that gender identity is always precarious, that its apparent unity and stability are always threatened by repressed libidinal drives.24 B ut this emphasis on precariousness is not an opening onto genuine historical thinking about shifts in peoples social identities. On the contrary, it is an insistence on a permanent, ahistorical condition, since for Lacanianism the only alternative to fixed gender identity is psychosis.

I f Lacanianism cannot provide an account of social identity that is useful for feminist theorizing, then it is unlikely to help us understand the formation of social groups. For Lacanianism, affiliation falls under the rubric of the imaginary. To affiliate with others, to align oneself with others in a social movement, would be tofall prey to the illusions of the imaginary ego. It would be to deny loss and lack, to seek an impossible unification and fulfillment. Thus, from the perspective of Lacanianism, collective movements would by definition be vehicles of delusion; they could not even in principle be emancipatory.25

Moreover, insofar as group formation depends on linguistic innovation, it is untheorizable from the perspective of Lacanianism. Because Lacanianism posits a fixed, monolithic symbolic system and a speaker who is wholly subjected to it, it is inconceivable that there could ever be any linguistic innovation. Speaking subjects could only ever reproduce the existing symbolic order; they could not possibly alter it. From this perspective, the question of cultural hegemony is blocked from view. There can be no question as to how the cultural authority of dominant groups in society is established and contested, no question of unequal negotiations between different social groups occupying different discursive positions. For Lacanianism, on the contrary, there is simply “ f/ie symbolic order,” a single universe of discourse that is so systematic, so all-pervasive, so monolithic that one cannot even conceive of such things as alternative perspectives, multiple discursive sites, struggles over social meanings, contests between hegemonic and counterhegemonic definitions of social situations, conflicts of interpretation of social needs. One cannot even conceive, really, of a plurality of different speakers.

With the way blocked to a political understanding of identities, groups, and cultural hegemony, the way is also blocked to an understanding of political practice. For one thing, there is no conceivable agent of such practice. Lacanianism posits a view of the person as a non-sutured congeries of three moments, none of which can qualify as a political agent. The speaking subject is simply the grammatical “ I,” a shifter wholly subjected to the symbolic order; it can only and forever reproduce that order. The ego is an imaginary projection, deluded about its own stability and self-possession, hooked on an impossible narcissistic desire for unity and self-completion; it therefore can only and forever tilt at windmills. Finally, there is the ambiguous unconscious, sometimes an ensemble of repressed libidinal drives, sometimes the face of language as Other, but never anything that could count as a social agent.

### Presumption---1NC

#### Presumption – the affirmative does not have a justification for the uniqueness of their advocacy to the subject they have critiqued, a method for how debates over that advocacy might alter the status quo, or an explanation of why the ballot is necessary – they need each to justify voting aff

#### They structurally can’t meet these – debate is a space shaped not by political introspection but strategic competition – losses result in modifying blocks, not opinions, and it encourages a race to the margins

#### That’s a voter:

#### a – burden of proof – the aff hasn’t met the burden of proving why their advocacy is necessary – vote neg to invalidate the incomplete argument they’ve made

#### b – means you err neg on any tests of competition – lack of demonstration of what they result in lowers the threshold for how you evaluate competitiveness and makes perms a neg argument

### Engagement Good – 1NC

#### State engagement is a pre-requisite to their offense.

Hill Collins, PhD, 8 (Patricia, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology @University of Maryland, College Park, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*, Routledge, Pgs. 277-280)

The structural domain of power encompasses how social institutions are organized to reproduce Black women’s subordination over time. One characteristic feature of this domain is its emphasis on large-scale, interlocking social institutions. An impressive array of U.S. social institutions lies at the heart of the structural domain of power. Historically, in the United States, the policies and procedures of the U.S. legal system, labor markets, schools, the housing industry, banking, insurance, the news media, and other social institutions as interdependent entities have worked to disadvantage African-American women. For example, Black women’s long-standing exclusion from the best jobs, schools, health care, and housing illustrates the broad array of social policies designed to exclude Black women from full citizenship rights. These interlocking social institutions have relied on multiple forms of segregation—by race, class, and gender—to produce these unjust results. For AfricanAmerican women, racial segregation has been paramount. Racial segregation rested on the “separate but equal” doctrine established under the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation of groups. This ruling paved the way for a rhetoric of color-blindness (Crenshaw 1997). Under the “separate but equal” doctrine, Blacks and Whites as groups could be segregated as long as the law was color-blind in affording each group equal treatment. Despite the supposed formal equality promised by “separate but equal,” subsequent treatment certainly was separate, but it was anything but equal. As a result, policies and procedures with housing, education, industry, government, the media, and other major social institutions have worked together to exclude Black women from exercising full citizenship rights. Whether this social exclusion has taken the form of relegating Black women to inner-city neighborhoods poorly served by social services, to poorly funded and racially segregated public schools, or to a narrow cluster of jobs in the labor market, the intent was to exclude. Within the structural domain of power, **empowerment cannot accrue to individuals and groups without transforming U.S. social institutions that foster this exclusion**. Because this domain is large-scale, systemwide, and has operated over a long period of time via interconnected social institutions, segregation of this magnitude cannot be changed overnight. Structural forms of injustice that permeate the entire society yield only grudgingly to change. Since they do so in part when confronted with wide-scale social movements, wars, and revolutions that threaten the social order overall, African-American women’s rights have not been gained solely by gradual reformism. A civil war preceded the abolition of slavery when all efforts to negotiate a settlement failed. Southern states routinely ignored the citizenship rights of Blacks, and even when confronted with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation, many dug in their heels and refused to uphold the law. Massive demonstrations, media exposure, and federal troops all were deployed to implement this fundamental policy change. The reemergence of White supremacist organizations in the 1990s, many of which recirculate troubling racist ideologies of prior eras, speaks to the deep-seated resentment attached to Black women, among others, working toward a more just U.S. society. Events such as these indicate how deeply woven into the very fabric of American society ideas about Black women’s subordination appear to be. In the United States, visible social protest of this magnitude, while often required to bring about change, remains more the exception than the rule. For U.S. Black women, social change has more often been gradual and reformist, punctuated by episodes of systemwide upheaval. Trying to change the policies and procedures themselves, typically through social reforms, constitutes an important cluster of strategies within the structural domain. Because the U.S. context contains a commitment to reformist change by changing the laws, Black women have used the legal system in their struggles for structural transformation. African-American women have aimed to challenge the laws that legitimate racial segregation. As Chapter 9’s discussion of Black women’s activism suggests, African-American women have used various strategies to get laws changed. Grassroots organizations**,** forming national advocacy organizations**,** and event-specific social protestsuch as boycottsand sit-inshave all been used**,** yet changing the laws and the terms of their implementation have formed the focus of change. Even the development of parallel social institutions such as Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women. While necessary, these legal victories may not be enough. Ironically, the same laws designed to protect African-American women from social exclusion have increasingly become used against Black women. In describing new models for equal treatment under the law, Black feminist legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw argues that the rhetoric of color-blindness was not unseated by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Instead, the rhetoric of color-blindness was reformulated to refer to the equal treatment of individuals by not discriminating among them. Under this new rhetoric of color-blindness, equality meant treating all individuals the same, regardless of differences they brought with them due to the effects of past discrimination or even discrimination in other venues. “Having determined, then, that everyone was equal in the sense that everyone had a skin color,” observes Crenshaw, “symmetrical treatment was satisfied by a general rule that nobody’s skin color should be taken into account in governmental decision-making” (Crenshaw 1997, 284). Within this logic, the path to equality lies in ignoring race, gender, and other markers of historical discrimination that might account for any differences that individuals bring to schools and the workplace. As a new rule that maintains long-standing hierarchies of race, class, and gender while appearing to provide equal treatment, this rhetoric of color-blindness has had some noteworthy effects. For one, observes Black feminist legal scholar Patricia Williams (1995), it fosters a certain kind of race thinking among Whites: Because the legal system has now formally equalized individual access to housing, schooling, and jobs, any unequal group results, such as those that characterize gaps between Blacks and Whites, must somehow lie within the individuals themselves or their culture. When joined to its twin of gender neutrality, one claiming that no significant differences distinguish men from women, the rhetoric of color-blindness works to unseat one important strategy of Black women’s resistance within the structural domain. Black women who make claims of discrimination and who demand that policies and procedures may not be as fair as they seem can more easily be dismissed as complainers who want special, unearned favors. Moreover, within a rhetoric of color-blindness that defends the theme of no inherent differences among races, or of gender-neutrality that claims no differences among genders, it becomes difficult to talk of racial and gender differences that stem from discriminatory treatment. The assumption is that the U.S. matrix of domination now provides equal treatment because where it once overtly discriminated by race and gender, it now seemingly ignores them. Beliefs such as these thus allow Whites and men to support a host of punitive policies that reinscribe social heirarchies of race and gender. In her discussion of how racism now relies on encoded language Angela Davis identifies how this rhetoric of color-blindness can operate as a form of “camouflaged racism”: Because race is ostracized from some of the most impassioned political debates of this period, their racialized character becomes increasingly difficult to identify, especially by those who are unable—or do not want— to decipher the encoded language. This means that hidden racist arguments can be mobilized readily across racial boundaries and political alignments. Political positions once easily defined as conservative, liberal, and sometimes even radical therefore have a tendency to lose their dis tinctiveness in the face of the seductions of this camouflaged racism (Davis 1997, 264). Americans can talk of “street crime” and “welfare mothers,” all the while claiming that they are not discussing race at all. Despite the new challenges raised by the rhetoric of color-blindness and gender neutrality, it is important to remember that **legal strategies have yielded and most probably will continue to produce victories for African-American women.** Historically, much of Black women’s resistance to the policies and procedures of the structural domain of power occurred outside powerful social institutions. Currently, however, African-American women are more often included in these same social institutions that long excluded us. Increasing numbers of African-American women have gained access to higher education, now hold good jobs, and might be considered middle-class if not elite. These women often occupy positions of authority inside schools, corporations, and government agencies. Achieving these results required changing U.S. laws.

### Psychic Energy Bad---1NC

#### An emphasis on psychic relief and energy results in a shift to particularized, discursive freedoms. This causes commodification and burnout because it confines ambition.

Marcus 12—PhD candidate at the University of Columbia focusing on twentieth-centruy American intellectual history, longtime editor at Dissent Magazine

(David, *“The Horizontalists,”* Published in *Dissent Magazine* Fall 2012, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-horizontalists)

There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of an ethnographer traveling in India. Journeying up and down the Ganges Delta, he encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.”“But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks.“A turtle.”“And the turtle?”“Another turtle.”“And it?”**“Ah, friend,”** smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.”As with most well-circulated apocrypha, **it is a parable that** lacks a clear provenance, but **has a clear moral:** that **despite our** **ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things**; that, in fact, ***there is nothing*** at the bottom of things. What we define as society is nothing more than a set of locally constructed practices and norms, and what we define as history is nothing more than the passage of one set to the next. Although we might “find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of tortoises rather ridiculous,” as one reteller admitted, it only raises the question, “Why do we think we know better?”Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary critics, philosophers, and jurists have all begun to turn from their particular disciplines to the more general question of interpretation. There has been an **increasing uneasiness with universal categories of thought**; a whispered suspicion and then a commonly held belief that the sum—societies, histories, identities—never amounts to more than its parts. New analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to both the pluralities and localities of life. “What we need,” as Clifford Geertz argued, “are not enormous ideas” but “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities.”This growing anxiety over the precision of our interpretive powers has translated into a variety of political as well as epistemological concerns. Many have become uneasy with universal concepts of justice and equality. Simultaneous to—and in part because of—**the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a “local knowledge.”** As Michael Walzer argued in a 1985 lecture on social criticism, “We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing ***for us*** to do?”This shift in scale has had a significant impact on the Left over the past twenty to thirty years. **Socialism**, once the “name of our desire,” **has all but disappeared; new desires have emerged in its place:** **situationism**, autonomism, **localism**, communitarianism, environmentalism, **anti-globalism**. Often spatial in metaphor, **they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen** rather **than** at what pace and **to what end**. Often local in theory and in practice, **they** have come to **represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal**, and from—what Geertz has called—the “thin” to the “thick.”Class, race, and gender—those classic left themes—are, to be sure, still potent categories. But they have often been imagined as spectrums rather than binaries, varying shades rather than static lines of solidarity. **Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks;** instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on localized campaigns and everyday practices. The critique of capitalism—once heavily informed by intricate historical and social theories—has narrowed. The “ruthless criticism of all,” as Karl Marx once put it, has turned away from exploitative world systems to the pathologies of an over-regulated life. As post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe declared in 1985,Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged….From Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’état, **from Kabul to** the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and **Cambodia, a question-mark has fallen more** and more **heavily over the whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it.**In many ways, the Left has just been keeping up with the times. Over the last quarter-century, there has been a general fracturing of our social and economic relations, a “multiplication of,” what one sociologist has called, “partial societies—grouped by age, sex, ethnicity, and proximity.” This has not necessarily been a bad thing. Even as the old Left—the ***vertical*** Left—frequently bemoaned the growing differentiation and individuation, these new categories did, in fact, open the door for marginalized voices and communities. They created a space for more diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. They signaled a turn toward the language of recognition: a politics more sensitive to difference. **But** this turn was also not without its disadvantages. **Gone was the Left’s hope for** an emerging **class consciousness, a movement of the “people” seeking greater realms of freedom. Instead of challenging the** top-down **structures of late capitalism, radicals now aspired to create**—what post-Marxists were frequently calling**—“spaces of freedom.”** If one of the explicit targets of the global justice movement of the late 1990s was the exploitative trade policies of the World Trade Organization, then **its underlying critique was the alienating** patterns of its **bureaucracy: the erosion of spaces for self-determination and expression**. The crisis of globalization was that it stripped individuals of their rights to participate, to act as free agents in a society that was increasingly becoming shaped by a set of global institutions. What most troubled leftists over the past three or four decades was not the increasingly unequal distribution of goods and services in capitalist societies but the increasingly unequal distribution of power. As one frequently sighted placard from the 1999 Seattle protests read, “No globalization without participation!”**Occupy** Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation **was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square**. And in a moment characterized by foreclosure, it was also symbolically, and sometimes literally, an attempt to reclaim lost homes and abandoned properties. But there was also a deeper notion of space at work. **Occupy** Wall Street **sought out not only new political spaces but also new ways to relate to them. By resisting the top-down** management of **representative democracy as well as the** bottom-up ideals of **labor movements, Occupiers hoped to create a new politics in which decisions moved** neither up nor down but **horizontally**. While embracing the new reach of globalization—linking arms and webcams with their encamped comrades in Madrid, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Santiago—they were also rejecting its patterns of consolidation, its limits on personal freedom, its vertical and bureaucratic structures of decision-making.**Time was also to be transformed**. The general assemblies and general strikes were efforts to reconstruct, and make more autonomous, our experience of time as well as space. Seeking to escape from the Taylorist demands of productivity, the **assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process**. **Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, and consensus is as much about repairing this sense of open-endedness as it is about agreeing** on a particular set of demands. Life is a mystery, as one pop star fashionista has insisted, and Occupiers wanted to keep it that way. Likewise, general st

rikes were imagined as ways in which workers could take back time—regain those parts of life that had become routinized by work. Rather than attempts to achieve large-scale reforms, general strikes were improvisations, escapes from the daily calculations of production that demonstrated that we can still be happy, creative, even productive individuals without jobs. As one unfurled banner along New York’s Broadway read during this spring’s May Day protests, “Why work? Be happy.”In many ways, the Occupy movement was a rebellion against the institutionalized nature of twenty-first century capitalism and democracy. **Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as** it was of **the technocratic** tendencies of the **state, it was** **ultimately an insurgency against control**, against the ways in which organized power and capital deprived the individual of the time and space needed to control his or her life. Just as the vertically inclined leftists of the twentieth century leveraged the public corporation—the welfare state—against the increasingly powerful number of private ones, so too were Occupy and, more generally, the horizontalist Left to embrace the age of the market: at the center of their politics was the anthropological “man” in both his forms—*homo faber* and *homo ludens*—who was capable of negotiating his interests outside the state. **For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left,** conservative or liberal, revolutionary or reformist categories. **On the one hand, it** was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing **hierarchies. On the other,** its language was imbued with a strident individualism: a politics of anti-institutionalism and personal freedom that has most often been affiliated with the Right.Seeking an alternative to the bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism and socialism, Occupiers were to frequently invoke the image of autonomy: of a world in which social and economic relations exist outside the institutions of the state. **Their aspiration was a society based on organic, decentralized circuits of exchange and deliberation—on voluntary associations, on local debate, on loose networks of affinity groups.**If political and economic life had become abstracted in the age of globalization and financialization, then Occupy **activists wanted to re-politicize our everyday choices**. As David Graeber, one of Occupy’s chief theoretical architects, explained two days after Zuccotti Park was occupied, **“The idea is essentially that “the system is not going to save us,” so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.”**Borrowing from the anarchist tradition, Graeber has called this work “direct action”: the practice of circumventing, even on occasion subverting, hierarchies through practical projects. Instead of attempting “to pressure the government to institute reforms” or “seize state power,” direct actions seek to “build a new society in the shell of the old.” By creating spaces in which individuals take control over their lives, it is a strategy of acting and thinking “as if one is **already free.” Marina Sitrin, another prominent Occupier, has offered another name for this politics—“horizontalism”: “the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus” and “processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.” It** is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present.**Direct action and horizontal democracy are new names, of course, for old ideas. They descend**—most directly—**from** the ideas and tactics of the global justice movement of the 1990s and 2000s. Direct Action Network was founded in 1999 to help coordinate **the anti-WTO protests in Seattle; *horizontalidad***, as it was called **in Argentina**, emerged as a way for often unemployed workers to organize during the financial crisis of 2001. Both emerged out of the theories and practices of a movement that was learning as it went along. The ad hoc working groups, the all-night bull sessions, the daylong actions, the decentralized planning were all as much by necessity as they were by design. They were not necessarily intended at first. But what emerged out of anti-globalization was a new vision of globalization. Local and horizontal in practice, direct action and democracy were to become catchphrases for a movement that was attempting to resist the often autocratic tendencies of a fast-globalizing capitalism.**But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer**, if often neglected, **tradition on the left:** the **anarchism**, syndicalism, **and autonomist Marxism** that stretch from Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Antonio Negri. **If revolutionary socialism was a theory about ideal possibilities, then anarchism and autonomism often focused on the revolutionary practices themselves**. The way in which the revolution was organized was the primary act of revolution. Autonomy, as the Greco-French Castoriadis told *Le Monde* in 1977, demands not only “the elimination of dominant groups and of the institutions embodying and orchestrating that domination” but also new modes of what he calls “self-management and organization.”With direct action and horizontal democracy, the Occupy movement not only developed a set of new tactics but also a governing ideology, a theory of time and space that runs counter to many of the practices of earlier leftist movements. Unlike revolutionary socialism or evolutionary social democracy—Marx’s Esau and Jacob—Occupiers conceived of time as more cyclical than developmental, its understanding of space more local and horizontal than structural and vertical. The revolution was to come but only through everyday acts. It was to occur only through—what Castoriadis obliquely referred to as—“the self-institution of society.”The seemingly spontaneous movement that emerged after the first general assemblies in Zuccotti Park was not, then, sui generis but an elaboration of a much larger turn by the Left. As occupations spread across the country and as activists begin to exchange organizational tactics, it was easy to forget that what was happening was, in fact, a part of a much larger shift in the scale and plane of Western politics: a turn toward more local and horizontal patterns of life, a growing skepticism toward the institutions of the state, and an increasing desire to seek out greater realms of personal freedom. And although its hibernation over the summer has, perhaps, marked the end of the Occupy movement, OWS has also come to represent an important—and perhaps more lasting—break. In both its ideas and tactics, it has given us a new set of desires—autonomy, radical democracy, direct action—that look well beyond the ideological and tactical tropes of socialism. Its occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street performances, its loose network of activists all suggest a bold new set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist ethos that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives.It can be argued that horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that **it is a kind of free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist.** For not only does it emphasize the agency of the individual, but it draws one of its central inspirations from a neoclassical image: that of the self-managing society—the polity that functions best when the state is absent from everyday decisions.But one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then horizontalism offers us a leftism that attempts to be, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, anti-institutional and democratic, open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long. Horizontalism has absorbed the crisis of knowledge—what we often call “postmodernism”—and the crisis of collectivism—what we often call “neoliberalism.” But instead of seeking to return to some golden age before our current moment of fracture, it seeks—for better and worse—to find a way to make leftist politics conform to our current age of anti-foundationalism and institutionalism. As Graeber argued in the prescriptive last pages of his anthropological epic, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*, “Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible” and we therefore need to give up “the false choice between state and market that [has] so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made it difficult to argue about anything else.” We need, in other words, to stop thinking like leftists.But herein lies the problem. Not all possible forms of human existence and social interaction, no matter how removed they are from the institutions of power and capital, are good forms of social organization. Although it is easy to look enthusiastically to those societies—ancient or modern, Western or non-Western—that exist beyond the structures of the state, they, too, have their own patterns of hierarchy, their own embittered lines of inequality and injustice. More important, to select one form of social organization over the other is **always an act of exclusion**. Instituting and then protecting a particular way of life will always require a normative commitment in which not every value system is respected—in which, in other words, there is a moral hierarchy.More problematically, by working outside structures of power one may circumvent coercive systems but one does **not necessarily subvert them**. Localizing politics—stripping it of its larger institutional ambitions—has, to be sure, its advantages. But without a larger structural vision, it does not go far enough**. “Bubbles of freedom,”** as Graeber calls them, may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But they will always neglect other crucial avenues of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down. In this way, the anti-institutionalism of horizontalism comes dangerously close to that of the libertarian Right. The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional space, the deep skepticism toward all forms of institutional life not only mirror the aspirations of libertarianism but help cloak those hierarchies spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital.**This is a** particularly **pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the** many **injustices** **of a non-institutional market**—in particular, its unregulated financial schemes. Perhaps this is an irony deeply woven into the theoretical quilt of autonomy: a vision that, as a result of its anti-institutionalism, is drawn to all sites of individual liberation—even those that are to be found in the marketplace. As Graeber concludes in *Debt*, “Markets, when allowed to drift entirely free from their violent origins, invariably begin to grow into something different, into networks of honor, trust, and mutual connectedness,” whereas “the maintenance of systems of coercion constantly do the opposite: turn the products of human cooperation, creativity, devotion, love and trust back into numbers once again.”In many ways, this is the result of a set of political ideas that have lost touch with their origins. The desire for autonomy was born out of the socialist—if not also often the Marxist—tradition and there was always a guarded sympathy for the structures needed to oppose organized systems of capital and power. Large-scale institutions were, for thinkers such as Castoriadis, Negri, and C.L.R. James, still essential if every cook was truly to govern. **To only “try to create ‘spaces** of freedom’ ‘alongside’ of the State” **meant**, as Castoriadis was to argue later in his life, **to back “down from the problem of politics**.” In fact, this was, he believed, the failure of 1968: “the inability to set up new, different institutions” and recognize that “there is no such thing as a society without institutions.”This is—and will be—a problem for the horizontalist Left as it moves forward. As a leftism ready-made for an age in which all sides of the political spectrum are arrayed against the regulatory state, it is always in danger of becoming absorbed into the very ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. For it aspires to a decentralized and organic politics that, in both principle and practice, shares a lot in common with its central target. Both it and the “free market” are anti-institutional. And the latter will remain so without larger vertical measures. **Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed**. The revolution cannot happen only on the ground; it must also happen from above. **A direct democracy still needs its indirect structures**, individual freedoms still need to be measured by their collective consequences, **and notions of social and economic equality still need to stand next to the desire for greater political participation. Deregulation is another regulatory regime, and to replace it requires new regulations**: institutions that will limit the excesses of the market. As Castoriadis insisted in the years after 1968, the Left’s task is not only to abolish old institutions but to discover “new kinds of relationship between society and its institutions.”Horizontalism has come to serve as an important break from the static strategies and categories of analysis that have slowed an aging and vertically inclined Left. OWS was to represent its fullest expression yet, though it has a much longer back story and still—one hopes—a promising future. But horizontalists such as Graeber and Sitrin will struggle to establish spaces of freedom if they cannot formulate a larger vision for a society. Their vision is not—as several on the vertical left have suggested—too utopian but not utopian enough: in seeking out local spaces of freedom, they have confined their ambitions; they have, in fact, come, at times, to mirror the very ideology they hope to resist. In his famous retelling of the turtle parable, Clifford Geertz warned that in “the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” we have to be careful to not “lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained.” This is an ever-present temptation, and one that, in our age of ever more stratification, we must resist.

#### They de-theorize the demand of the academy, hopelessly yearning for liberatory strategies through the voice of suffering---that solution politics uses the false machinations of hope in a different sphere.

Jayan Nayar, law prof at the University of Warwick, 12-15-2012, The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority, <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10978-012-9115-8/fulltext.html>

People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data), nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name ‘suffering’. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of theory possesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to ‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition; voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport to offer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory, suffering itself becomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’—the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other—of imperial recognition, response and intervention.20 Thus rationalised solutions are offered to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering that is perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning. Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violation becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering as global injustice becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models’ (Young 2006); or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004) or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking suffering and its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to entrench further the Levinasian injunction to responsibility—for further endeavours of thinking-hope, to serve further the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, as depoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi for legitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. A corrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, with every call for the alleviation of suffering (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption—we, who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition—that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises in which we wish to believe. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question: what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How many more resources? What kind of political institutions? Perhaps to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, so many questions are followed by so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity—that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; should redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations; should enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible; should reform and democratise international institutions. The list, again, goes on, as do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009). Andrew Linklater’s contemplations on the prospects for ‘cosmopolitan obligations’ for ‘distant suffering’ is characteristic of the intellectual idealism of much theorisings of Humanity’s hopeful futures: the gulf between human societies may not be so difficult to bridge. … The obstacles to substantial progress have been well documented, and they will continue to shape the tracks along which globalization travels. But it is not beyond the ingenuity of the human race to rise above increasingly problematical particularistic moralities, and to create global arrangements that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obligations to reduce distant suffering. (Linklater 2007, p. 33) As if the failures thus far have been simply due to a lack of ingenuity of the ‘human race’! What if, instead, the world order of inflicted suffering (and ‘the gulf between human societies’), the order of global impoverishment and insecurities, persists not merely as the outcome of a failure of (humane) consciousness to be corrected by suffering-based ethical theorisations of human rights and global justice, but as the result of created, planned and effected imperialist design as it continuously seeks to reshape world orders for profit? To what extent do the many ethical urgings for global transformations actually encounter the geo-and bio-politics of global coloniality that is defined by the material desires, motivations and actions of globalising elites, for whom, as Bauman (2003, p. 20) tells us, visions of the good life are defined not by attachments (to the suffering Other) but by a ‘disengaged imagination’ that seeks no utopian mission.26 In the face of such actualities, what do we make of the useful suffering of the ethical Self who purports to think for the Other? Inconsequentiality is the least of the criticisms that may be made. Nandy’s observation is pertinent: ‘domination today is rarely justified through oracles, ritual superiority, or claims to birthrights; domination is now more frequently justified in terms of better acquaintance with universal knowledge and better access to universal modes of acquiring knowledge’ (Nandy 2007, p. 227). Theorisations of hope that gaze upon suffering and that purport to contemplate, manage and solve suffering, therefore, as knowing (and modes of knowing) the Other, help create masks of hegemony for the brutal faces of domination.27

# 2NC – Round 1

## Cap

#### That turns case – it’s a para-ontological phenomenon that defangs black radicalism, penetrating even the maroons of the university – that’s a frame to read their evidence through.

Curry 13 (Tommy; lack Studies, Not Morality: Anti-Black Racism, Neo-Liberal Cooptation, and the Challenges to Black Studies Under Intersectional Axioms. // 2013; <https://www.academia.edu/8160498/_Draft_Black_Studies_Not_Morality_Anti-Black_Racism_Neo-Liberal_Cooptation_and_the_Challenges_to_Black_Studies_Under_Intersectional_Axioms> //Ritt)

Our present day descriptions of the crisis of Black Studies have identified neo-liberalism as a major cause of the financial and political obstacles preventing flourishing of the discipline. In this schema there is a shared concerned with other liberal arts programs that their contributions to the university are being devalued because of the encroaching corporatism in the American university. Henry Giroux‟s (2002) “Neo -liberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of Higher Education: The University of as a Democratic Public Sphere” warns that under neoliberalism politics are market driven and the claims of democratic citizenship are subordinated to market values” (p.428). According to Giroux (2002) these are ubiquitous in scope. “As large amounts of corporate capital flow into the universities, those areas of study in the university that don't translate into substantial profits get either marginalized, underfunded, or eliminated… we are witnessing…a downsizing in the humanities …Moreover, programs and courses that focus on areas such as critical theory, literature, feminism, ethics, environmentalism, post-colonialism, philosophy, and sociology suggest an intellectual cosmopolitanism or a concern with social issues that will be either eliminated or technicized because their role in the market will be judged as ornamental” (p.434). But the role of neoliberalism has been underappreciated and understudied in relation to Black politics and the 21 st century articulations of “race.” While Giroux‟s analysis suggests a shared neoliberal repression upon the marked Black community of the university, Lester Spence correctly observes that “while scholars and activists alike increasingly use the concept of neoliberalism to explain rising levels of racial inequality they… miss the way this dynamic is reproduced within, and not simply on black communities ” (2012, p.140). This “reproduction within” Black communities exposes an unattended aspect of the political economy at work in the valuation of discourse and ideology within the university. The current deployment of neoliberalism in relation to the fields of knowledge and “politics” in Black Studies thereby exposes a paraontological dilemma in our diagnosis; as neoliberalism both represents the market ontology of corporations (our traditional understanding), and the internalization as homo-economicus (the Black subject as self-interested economic thinker). As Joy James (2000) observes , “In academe, a self/text preoccupation and careerism may marginalize or psychologize political struggles. In the present form of Black Studies, it is not unusual to find writers advocating for the intellectual-interrogator as more enlightened than the activist-intellectual (we also find the inflation of literary production into a form of political “activism” without analysis of the relation to community organizing. Professionalizing progressive discourse validating it within academic conversation, has a lot to do with the commodification of not only Black Studies, but Black radicalism within Black Studies. This analysis is not all together surprising given the research of Fabio Rojas ‟s (2007) From Black Power to Black Studies which argues that the corporate foundations like Ford and Carnegie directly influenced and deradicalized the course of Black Studies departments in the years following the Civil Rights movement from paradigms focusing on material-nationalist-radicalism accounts of racism to poststructuralist-integrationist-reformism accounts of identity through post-doctoral fellowships and grants. In contrast to our present day articulations of neoliberalism, or more appropriately the neoliberal crisis in relation to Black Studies, we are not only bringing attention to the externality of a white supremacist corporatism which devalues Blackness, but the reification of neoliberal axioms in the production and commodification of Black radicalism by Black scholars in Black Studies.

#### 2 – Local to Global Bad – the question of this debate is which model translates collectives to overcome commoditization of dissent – the perm that scales up from “local” to “global” gets the direction of causality wrong by mystifying how world economies structure local relations – misdiagnosis turns solvency.

Engel-Di Mauro 9 – Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

Despite the emphasis on multiple scales of analysis, ‘‘webs of relation” (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007), ‘‘chains of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 27), ‘‘bottom-up” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 82), or ‘‘progressive contextualisation” (Vayda, 1983), most of the work in political ecology privileges spatio-temporally limited social contexts over longer-term, macro-scale social processes (Bridge, 2002, p. 371). While this may be the outcome of a recent distancing from political economy perspectives (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 611), the problem was inherent from the very beginning, with a tendency to emphasise the ‘‘regional” or meso-scale (and then ‘‘local”, or micro-scale) as the starting unit of analysis. This analytical centring of smaller-scale dynamics has resulted in an inability to integrate general patterns and interconnections with ethnographic and eco- systemic data (Blaikie, 1999, p. 140; Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 612). This is far from saying that micro- or meso-specificity is less important than macro-specificity (the two are equally important in my view). Micro- and meso-level analysis is pivotal in under- standing people–environment relations, especially given that the most tangible occur largely over small areas. Yet emphasis on the smaller scale becomes a hindrance when it guides, rather than builds the empirical foundations of a research project. With few exceptions, political ecology continues to suffer from a methodological insis- tence on explaining people–environment relations through the analysis of smaller-scale circumstances and/or starting points. Planet-wide environmental and, since at least 500 years ago, social processes enable and/or constrain smaller-scale people–environment relations, especially with recent human-induced shifts in atmosphere composition (radiative forcing through greenhouse gas emissions, stratospheric ozone layer disruption through the emissions of bromines and chlorofluorocarbons, regional releases of atmospheric pollutants through burning vegetation and coal com- bustion, etc.). The scale of analysis adopted in a research project may depend on the kind of question one wishes to answer (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 65), but ultimately larger-scale processes must be included to arrive at explanations that go beyond appeals to complexity (Blaikie, 1985) or beyond eclecticism in the frameworks being combined (Blaikie, 1999, p. 139). The matter is exacerbated when phenomena in some parts of the whole are confused for evidence that negates either the existence of the entire system (or of any systemic process at all) or denies the possibility of a general theory on resource management (e.g., Black, 1990; Forsyth, 2003). There are other epistemological repercussions from such small locality-specific analyses and small-to-large scale approaches. One is treating places (or regions) as isolatable (often implicitly, by not paying attention to wider systemic processes), which enabled political ecology to circumscribe the range of social and environmental contexts to those far away from most political ecologists’ homes (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2004). The underlying problem was reflected in the exclusion of places outside rural ‘‘third” world areas from the purview of political ecology (countries in the former state-socialist camp are still mostly ignored).2 Recent attention to wealthy industrialised capitalist societies and urban ecosystems is a helpful first step in moving political ecology away from a relatively narrow focus3 and into more promising cross-comparative terrain that can generate more systematic analy- sis (see works guest edited by Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2006).

#### The trade-off is huge.

Meyerson 97 [Gregory, “Marxism, Psychoanalysis and Labor Competition,” <http://clogic.eserver.org/1-1/meyerson.html>]

9. Roediger guts the force of the political/economic/ideological explanation of the riots in order to make the psychosexual view more attractive. Racism is not a cover for labor competition so much as the inverse--labor competition hides the deeper, unthinking, psychosexual matrix. The presence of graphic, grotesque, well-nigh gothic violence facilitates a kind of slippage in Roediger's (and others') explanatory vocabulary reinforcing the turn to depth psychology. Rage, a secondary phenomenon of racism, is turned into a primary phenomenon, the index of its own deep cause. Emotional intensity is split off from political and ideological elements that shape it and make it intelligible, then attributed to an autonomous psychoanalysis. I would suggest that this is the kind of analysis that roots the holocaust in the mass psychology of the German people, the destruction of Southeast Asia in the psychology of the grunt, the Indonesian government's massacre of the PKI in the unshackled Dionysian energies of Balinese peasants. That racist social structures and racist ideologies are necessarily realized psychologically and often in fanatical, even genocidal, ways does not mean that a libidinally-rooted fanaticism plays a significant causal role in atrocities, racist or otherwise.6 10. I hope to show what's wrong with this analysis by looking at Allen's Marxian social control analysis of labor competition and racist rage. Unlike Roediger, Allen repudiates psychoanalytic explanations of white racism as both a-historical and themselves racist. Unlike Roediger, he does not focus on practices of self-formation among the Irish--how the Irish created themselves anew as white. He does not need to deny Irish agency and the murderous practices through which the white working-class self has often been secured. Nevertheless, Allen's objections to labor competition are strikingly similar to Roediger's. Allen, in looking at the population growth of New York City, notes that the foreign born made up more than half the city's population in 1855 and increased by 57,000 in the next five years. As he puts it: "fifteen thousand people a years were settling in the city, more than the total African-American resident population. Such a rate of immigration would, of course, tend to increase 'labor competition.' But why should it have been 'racial'?" There were "four times as many non-Irish foreign-born whites in the labor market as compared to African-Americans." 11. Accompanying the labor competition case is the view that white working-class racism was a response, however tragic, to the role black workers played as strikebreakers. Allen comments that it does not help the labor competition case to avoid mention of German strikebreakers and other European strikebreakers, not to mention labor competition among the Irish themselves leading to "'many a bloody brawl'" between men from Connaught and men from Cork or Ulster. There were black strikebreakers and white strikebreakers, but "the murderous wrath of the strikers was reserved for those of 'dark skin,' who were pursued by the mob, crying 'drive off the damn niggers' and 'kill the niggers'" (Allen, 192-4). 12. The purely economic logic is not insignificant--competition is built into wage labor. But it is a precondition for the "racializing" of this competition (and the murderousness associated with it), not an explanation. Like Roediger, Allen sees labor competition as a rationalization for a pre-existing racializing logic. For Allen, however, this racializing logic is a continuation of the logic worked out by the planters of Virginia to divide white and black (or rather to produce whiteness and blackness in order to oppose them). It is not a psycho-logic but a political and ideo-logic devised and continually reinforced by the ruling classes in the service of class rule and capital accumulation. This does not rule out a creative or re-signifying component in the racializing practices of white workers. (That Native Americans took up the Jeffersonian ideal does not deny the main point, that this Jeffersonianism functioned as part of a logic of dispossession.)

#### Class is intersectional – no crowdout

Taylor 16. Keeanga-Yamahtta. Assistant Professor of African American Studies at Princeton. *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*, Haymarket Books, pp. 214-5, Abliest language is a quote from Tim Wise whom Taylor is critiquing.

The “blind spot” of class within the framework of people like Tim Wise not only leaves the incapable of explaining class divisions among the oppressed, it also underemphasizes the material foundation for solidarity and unity within the working class. Instead, the concepts of solidarity and unity are reduced to whether or not one chooses to be an “ally.” There’s nothing wrong with being an ally, but it doesn’t quite capture the degree to which Black and white workers are inextricably linked. It’s not as if white workers can simply choose not to “ally” with Black workers to no peril of their own. The scale of attack on the living standards of the working class is overwhelming. There is a systematic, bipartisan effort to dismantle the already anemic welfare state. When, in 2013, $5 billion was cut from food stamps, it had a direct and deleterious impact on the lives of tens of millions of white working-class people.

In this context, solidarity is not just an option; it is crucial to workers’ ability to resist the constant degradation of their living standards. Solidarity is only possible through relentless struggle to win white workers to antiracism, to expose the lie that Black workers are worse off because they somehow choose to be, and to win the white working class to the understanding that, unless they struggle, they too will continue to live lives of poverty and frustration, even if those lives are somewhat better than the lives led by Black workers. Success or failure are contingent on whether or not working people see themselves as brothers and sisters whose liberation is inextricably bound together.

Solidarity is standing in unity with people even when you have not personally experienced their particular oppression. The reality is that as long as capitalism exists, material and ideological pressures push white workers to be racist and all workers to hold each other in general suspicion. But there are moments of struggle when the mutual interests of workers are laid bare, and when the suspicion is finally turned in the other direction – at the plutocrats who live well while the rest of us suffer. The key question is whether or not in those moments of struggle a coherent political analysis of society, oppression, and exploitation can be articulated that makes sense of the world we live in, but that also champions the vision of a different kind of society – and a way to get there.

No serious socialist current in the last hundred years has ever demanded that Black or Latino/a workers put their struggles on the back burner while some other class struggle is waged first. This assumption rests on the mistaken idea that the working class is white and male, and therefore incapable of taking up issues of race, class, and gender. In fact, the American working class is female, immigrant, Black, white, Latino/a, and more. Immigrant issues, gender issues, and antiracism are working-class issues.

#### Only the alt solves their offense

Davis 19 (Elizabeth Davis is a PhD candidate in Social Justice Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. Beside(s) Love and Hate: The Politics of Consuming Black Culture. Theory & Event. Volume 22, Number 3, July 2019. Project Muse//shree)

For Wynter, this thinking beside(s) love and hate requires attending to the articulation of feelings with structures of feeling. She describes how the Black Power Movement, and other social movements of the 1960s and '70s, alongside the global anti-colonial movements, enacted a "psychic emancipation" by which subjugated peoples profoundly reimagined their conceptions of themselves (2006, 110). This shift marked a positive reaffirmation of identity exemplified in the slogan "Black is Beautiful." But it was a psychic emancipation, Wynter says, "effected at the level of the map, rather than at the level of the territory. That is, therefore, at the level of the systemic devalorization of blackness and correlated over-valorization of whiteness, which are themselves only proximate functions of the overall devalorization of the human species" (2006, 116). For Wynter, that these feelings effected a global psychic emancipation, does not mean they were the "right feelings." They were an insufficient challenge to the mode of sociogeny of the dominant global order.

To change the mode of sociogeny of a culture, to find the answer "on the objective as well as the subjective level" (Fanon 2008, xv) would take a stance beside(s) the affirmation that Black is Beautiful. A reimagination of the human that in Frank Wilderson's (2010) terms requires recognizing subjective capacity as itself built against blackness. For Wilderson, this imagining is a more difficult task today than in the 1960s and '70s: "though the semantic field on which subjectivity is imagined has expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and globalization theory, Blackness and an unflinching articulation of Redness are more unimaginable and illegible within this expanded semantic field than they were during the height of the FBI's repressive Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO)" (2010, 9). For Wilderson (in contrast to contemporary "feelings" of progress) blackness has become less legible, and to decipher the "grammar of [Black] suffering" that underwrites cinematic and political speech rests not on a question of love and hate but, drawing on Saidiya Hartman, of accumulation and fungibility.13

But if there are many different registers and orientations of feeling as it is lived in relation to structures of feeling, what would it be, how [End Page 590] would we know, at what level of feeling we are feeling? Or rather, how might we conceptualize subjective, intersubjective and collective feeling as articulated with the political—in particular historical moments, in social movements, and in the reproduction of the episteme? This unclarity about levels and modes of love, affirmation, and celebration of blackness, is one origin story of how both Jared Sexton and Fred Moten come to need to state that "Afro-pessimism is 'not but nothing other than' black optimism" (Moten 2013, 742; Sexton 2011, 37). Afro-pessimism is the insistence on thinking with and through the "subjectivity under erasure" (Wilderson 2010, xi) that is blackness, and black optimism is an orientation and opening up towards the possibilities of black life. They hold in tension that black social death and black social life do not negate each other (Sexton 2011, 28–29). If the misrecognition that would posit them as opposites marks a scene of dissensus, then it is not through the identity of black optimism and Afro-pessimism that an ethics is possible, but as Moten would have it, recognizing the difference between the two as infinitesimal: "…if Afro-pessimism is the study of [the impossibility of loving blackness], the thinking that I have to offer […] moves not in that impossibility's transcendence but rather in its exhaustion" (Moten 2013, 738).

Exhaustion, of the im/possibility of loving blackness, would take all of the steam out of the engines of progress that narratively frame representation—where consumption is conflated with both legibility and love. For who is to say that the white woman didn't love blackness who came up to Billie Holiday in an L.A. nightclub to request that she sing "Strange Fruit" by saying: "Why don't you sing that sexy song you're so famous for? You know, the one about the naked bodies swinging in the trees" (Davis 1998, 195). The point being not to validate such a love, but to be weary and wary of the terms of engagement by which "love" must be idealized and defended.

Economies of white enjoyment of black life have defined the brutal processes of racialization forged in the Middle Passage that shape who and how we are (Hartman 1997). In the "afterlife of slavery" (Hartman 2006), if we are to apprehend that term, we are obliged to study how these libidinal and affective economies are articulated with the formal economy. What neoliberal capitalist politico-economics has done best is to erode our capacity to imagine things differently. It feels like we have less with which to imagine ways of being together outside our current circuits of production, distribution, exchange, consumption. That Harriet Tubman is slated to be the new face of the US twenty-dollar bill calls me quite clearly to reject the prevailing notion that relations of consumption are good enough kinds of relations. [End Page 591]

## case

#### independent link to the k

Arnesen 1 – Professor of history and African-American studies at the University of Illinois [Eric, “Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination,” *Int’l Labor and Working-Class History*, No. 60, p. 3-32]

On the Couch: Psychoanalyzing the Closed-Lipped

The creative liberties taken by whiteness scholars are particularly manifest in their efforts to peer into the heart of whiteness. Unencumbered by evidence but exuding considerable confidence, they offer Freudian readings of the inner mind of white people or white-people-in-the-making. Roediger’s treatment of the Northern, urban, antebellum, white working-class is a case in point. “In a sense,” Thomas Holt observes in a reference to the probing of nineteenth-century keywords as clues to identity, Roediger “uses the Oxford English Dictionary to put the nation on the psychiatrist’s couch.”82 At its core, Roediger’s argument centers on “projection” by a working class traumatized by its uprooting from the Irish countryside, with the attendant “loss of a relationship with nature” that produced acute “anxieties” and “desires” and the relentless sweep of industrial discipline that deskilled their trades and undermined their independence. Workers “disciplined and made anxious by fear of dependency” began “to construct an image of the Black population as ‘other’ – as embodying the preindustrial, erotic, careless style of life the white worker hated and longed for.” For Roediger, the anti-black riots of the antebellum era “bespoke the anxieties . . . of a working population experiencing new forms of industrial discipline,” while the minstrel stage’s attraction to white workers derived from the possibility that “preindustrial joys could survive amidst industrial discipline.”83 In effect moving from the psychological wage to a psychoanalytical one, Roediger informs us that “[p]sychoanalytically, the smearing of soot or blackening over the body represents the height of polymorphous perversity, an infantile playing with excrement or dirt. It is the polar opposite of the anal retentiveness usually associated with accumulating capitalist and Protestant cultures.”84 When these polymorphously perverse whites fought against black participation in antebellum public celebrations, Roediger suggests envy may well have been involved. For, as he informs us, slaves had come from “areas more aesthetically inclined” than had whites, a fact ostensibly recognized by whites who “credited Blacks with tremendous expressive power.”85 In this passage, one essentialized if speechless group – whites – apparently is motivated by jealousy of another essentialized group – people of African descent. Turning to the question of violence, Roediger finds a “convincing explanation” for the mobbing of African Americans by blackfaced whites in Philadelphia in the claim that whites “both admired what they imagined blackness to symbolize and hated themselves for doing so.”86 Without evidence, a little psychohistory can be a dangerous thing. In what is perhaps the least grounded exploration into workers’ minds and motivations, Barrington Walker concludes that the 1866 Memphis riots were “an outward manifestation of psychocultural angst on the part of a despised group [the Irish] which des- perately wanted to identify with the dominant culture, and to symbolically stake its own claim to whiteness.”87

It would have been helpful if, when the composite Irish were placed on the psychohistorians’ couch, they would have cooperated by providing even a single line of firsthand reflection into their angst, desperate longings, “insecurity,” and other motivations. Their silence, however, gives the historians of whiteness little pause. The psychoanalysis of whiteness here differs from the “talking cure” of Freudianism partly in its neglect of the speech of those under study. If psychoanalysis requires the patient’s extensive verbalization of her or his problems, whiteness psychohistory dispenses altogether with real people and their words and instead freely ascribes deep motivation and belief to its subjects on the basis of the historians’ freewheeling interpretation of behavior and other people’s words. “I found not one single diary, or letter, or anything of that sort in which an ordinary Irish man or woman recorded in any detail the texture of daily life and relations with the black people who were often his or her closest neighbors,” Ignatiev honestly admits at the conclusion of his book. “Consequently, like a paleontologist who builds a dinosaur from a tooth, I have been forced to reconstruct from fragments, and to infer.”88 No other historians of Irish whiteness have done any better. Paleontology requires different skills than psychoanalysis, and the patient who would confuse the former for the latter will surely not receive the treatment required. Likewise, readers of whiteness scholarship would do well to keep in mind the difference when evaluating the grand insights into the minds of essentialized but often silent subjects.

The weaknesses of Roediger’s psychohistorical exegesis of the white worker’s mind are abundant. First, it proffers a composite portrait of a white working class, with little regard for region, religion, craft or occupation, or, the Irish excepted, ethnicity; those actual workers it does examine make only cameo appearances in examples with insufficient context. Roediger’s reluctance to link systematically his largely cultural analyses to chronological change or anchor them in historical institutions makes racism out to be “once again like some innate quality of human behavior,” to borrow Holt’s words. “The occasional thinness of Roediger’s exposition of the historical specificity” of racial identity, Holt concludes, “leaves an appearance of vulnerability and incompleteness.”89 The model’s analysis of early nineteenth-century capitalist industrialization and its relationship to the emotional worlds of workers is also strained, relying heavily on a stark but untenable dichotomy between preindustrial and industrial worlds.90 The feelings attributed to white workers – including their alleged sense of intensifying whiteness – is derivative of their place in the emerging capitalist order, posited theoretically, not empirically. The exegesis is also highly selective in its choice of examples, drawing almost exclusively from moments of dramatic conflict pitting the Irish or other white workers against African Americans, while failing to account for patterns of coexistence. The “relations of Irish and African Americans were polyvalent,” historian Graham Hodges has recently argued of mid-nineteenth-century New York City. “Although they competed economically and lived closely together, Irish and black coexisted far more peacefully than historians have suggested . . . Although disharmony and conflict abounded, there were also many points of cooperation.” This is a portrait at almost complete odds with the one drawn by historians of whiteness, who tend to depict their composite whites in a fairly one-dimensional manner and to focus almost exclusively on instances of dramatic conflict. A fuller consideration of the social and political history of racial identity, community development, and group interaction would reveal the profound cracks in the very foundations of whiteness scholarship.91

#### It’s particularly toxic in racial analysis.

Mrinalini Greedharry 8, Professor of English at Laurentian University, 2008, Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis: From Uneasy Engagements to Effective Critique, p. 121-124

The first problem Deleuze and Guattari identify, a problem that arches over the following four objections, is that psychoanalysis fundamentally misrecognizes and subsequently misrepresents desire. While this is true in the general sense that psychoanalysis poses its theories as a mediating structure between our desires and us, it is also true in the particular sense that Deleuze and Guattari describe below:

we have a triangulation that implies in its essence a constituent prohibition, and that conditions the differentiation between persons: prohibition of incest with the mother, prohibition against taking the father’s place. But a strange sort of reasoning leads one to conclude since it is forbidden, that very thing was desired. (70)

In other words, according to the psychoanalytic scheme, we only realize Oedipus is our desire at the same moment when we realize we can never fulfil that desire. Desire is the thing that escapes us. Naturally, given their commitment to non-representational thought, Deleuze and Guattari object to this conceptualization of desire as something that only becomes visible, or articulated, at the moment when it is displaced because it is located in the theoretical framework as the ‘invisible’ or lacking thing. They object to psychoanalysis’ failure to understand that the prohibition of a desire is not desire itself— that lack or incompletion is not the defining feature of desire. For them, as evidenced by the concept of desiring-machines, desire is something that is produced by and between bodies not repressed or permitted according to Oedipal laws.

Though this first objection is posed at the meta-philosophical level it has consequences for postcolonial studies. If psychoanalysis misrepresents desire, or rather conflates its own theorization of what desire is with desire itself, then its value as an actual theory of desire is significantly diminished. Psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest, is nothing more than a discourse about its own conceptualization of desire. If this is true, then studying psychoanalysis as one Western theory of desire among others may well be an important task for postcolonial studies, but using psychoanalysis as a theory of desire to explain and account for the colony seems to be an exercise in proving that the theory works in other contexts. Bhabha’s work, as we saw in the previous chapter, was criticized on precisely these grounds. It would seem clear, however, that colonial societies were social and political formations that incited, produced and managed different economies of desire than those produced in the metropolitan centres. If psychoanalysis can only refer all formations of desire back to its Oedipal conceptualizations, then postcolonial studies needs to develop its own conceptual tools for explaining the singularly colonial productions of desire.

Though Deleuze and Guattari discard the notion that desire can be repressed, they do not discard the possibility that the Oedipal prohibition works as a form of social repression. In fact, they argue that Oedipus, though it is not a genuine prohibition, functions as a social repression because the Oedipus is a way of thinking about desire that has captured us. We believe that Oedipus is the only way to think about our desires, and so we allow ourselves to be caught in the Oedipus trap. In their own words, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the Oedipus is:

the bait, the disfigured image, by means of which repression catches desire in the trap. If desire is repressed, this is not because it is desire for the mother and for the death of the father ... The danger is elsewhere. If desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a society. (116)

They argue that psychoanalysis has an interest in presenting Oedipus itself as the repressed desire, since in this way, psychic repression appears primary and social repression must appear to follow later, as a secondary problem. We might think, for example, of the alternative to Lacan’s mirror stage proposed by Fanon. He claims that the black child in the closed world of his or her family is psychologically healthy, but that the child’s contact with the social forces of the racist world triggers problems.

Deleuze and Guattari insist that it is social repression that depends on psychic repression, or, in other words that ‘psychic repression, is a means in the service of social repression’ (119). They do not attempt to do away with the separate concept of psychic repression, but they recognize that social repression sometimes delegates its work to agents of psychic repression, such as, most obviously, the family. They argue that it is vital not simply that desire be repressed but that it takes repressive forms that the subjects themselves desire, hence their affirmation of Wilhem Reich’s proposition that the masses are never simply fooled but have their desires educated, coded and recoded back to them so that desire can go on being repressed. Desire is not something to be released from repression, it is something to be captured and recaptured by an ethics, such as Anti-Oedipus, that enable us to look clearly at those forces that have desire in their hold.

Repression of desire is, in fact, a ready and familiar trope for explaining the psychic and social features of colonial society. We saw a perfect example of this in Nandy’s work. Nandy proposed that the discourse of hyper-masculinity the British introduced to India was a result of their repressed homosexuality, a repression that could be resolved in the colonies where British men were more free to express their homophilia, if not their homosexuality. The notion that the colonies were a place where the colonizer could resolve his psychic repressions, either by expressing them or sublimating them, is not unique to Nandy; it is almost a cliché in the histories and literatures of colonialism. But if psychic repression is a theoretical object produced by psychoanalysis, and it is also an object that distracts our clear view of the social conditions of repression, then it is not the most useful concept for postcolonial studies. In fact, it may also be preventing us from reading colonial formations of desire in their immediacy. Nandy’s example is instructive. Though he is able to focus our attention on a historical moment where British and Indian desires produced a uniquely colonial formation of masculinity he is not able to describe this formation as anything more than a psychic repression with social consequences. Like Bhabha, Nandy is able to show us that repression is a mechanism that works in the colonies too but he is not able to show us how the social, political, cultural and economic conditions brought psychic desires into play in order to achieve colonization.

# 1NR

## T

#### Topical affs could reorganize anti-trust law around racial equity concerns.

Nicol Turner Lee 21. Senior Fellow - Governance Studies Director - Center for Technology Innovation, Brookings, with Caitlin Chin – Research Analyst, Center for Technology Innovation - The Brookings Institution, 7/8/21. “The debate on antitrust reform should incorporate racial equity.” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/07/08/the-debate-on-antitrust-reform-should-incorporate-racial-equity/

On June 24, the House Judiciary Committee voted to advance six landmark antitrust bills, which, if enacted into law, could decrease anticompetitive practices in the tech industry. This would be a necessary—and long overdue—correction to the decades-long Chicago School jurisprudence, under which courts have interpreted antitrust laws to primarily equate consumer harms to higher monetary costs for products or services. It shows that Congress is recognizing how the traditional Chicago School approach does not fully address the many non-monetary consequences that can result from concentration in the technology industry, such as privacy risks and power over speech.

While those issues are important, the recent actions coming from the FTC and Congress should not miss out on the opportunity to address another aspect of antitrust: racial equity. Since the potential harms—both monetary and non-monetary—that accompany concentrated markets do not affect all individuals equally, a facially-neutral approach to competition enforcement is not fair or equitable. Communities of color can suffer grave economic consequences or experience competitive isolation when products and services are not offered or are disproportionately represented in their markets. For example, noncompete contracts can negatively impact Black and other workers of color, especially post-employment restrictions that can increase employer monopsony power in labor markets, and suppress salaries and future earnings. As another example, the rising number of mergers and acquisitions across the overall U.S. economy may contribute to declining startup rates, particularly affecting diverse entrepreneurs who face outsized challenges to raising capital and accessing credit for their ventures.

With the growing interest in antitrust—and the granular focus on Big Tech—within Congress and the new administration, racial equity should be positioned as one of the core pillars of any future actions. Toward this goal, the antitrust community should be sensitized to the role of institutional inequities in concentrated markets, considering them when analyzing anticompetitive actions, their outcomes, and associated enforcement actions.

Why racial equity is a competition concern

Under the letter of the law, antitrust and civil rights are generally treated as separate statutes. Yet in practice, their values intertwine: Market dominance can effectively put companies in a powerful position to exacerbate historical racial inequalities. Take the search engine market, for example, of which Google controls over 90%. In 2012, Harvard professor Latanya Sweeney discovered that Google searches for individuals with Black-sounding names were more likely to generate advertisements for arrest records than searches for individuals with white-sounding names—even if no arrest records actually existed. This flawed system could result in significant emotional, reputational, or financial harm for racially-stereotyped individuals, as well as amplify the profiling associated with algorithmic biases. The lack of competition in the online search industry not only eliminates consumers’ options to choose a different, less-biased search engine, but also reduces market incentives for Google to improve its biased algorithms, as was recently illustrated by the dismissal of the former technical co-lead of Google’s Ethical Artificial Intelligence Team, Timnit Gebru.

Large technology companies also routinely collect massive volumes of data about people, compounded in scale through mergers and acquisitions. Using this data, they can surveil selected populations for online behavioral advertising or micro-interactions based on known or inferred attributes. In this sense, advertisers choose which communities can see or do not see their ads—either through the direct targeting of demographic variables like age, gender, sexual orientation, or race, or through “proxy variables” like zip code, education, interests, and purchase history. These activities can disproportionately impact marginalized communities who may be shown different employment, credit cards, housing, and other advertisements based on the platform or advertising algorithm. More concerning, companies like Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook have each engaged in activities that have cemented their respective market power, allowing them to continue to wield control over the advertisements which their hundreds of millions of users see.

Including equity as a goal in antitrust enforcement

Last year, then-acting FTC Chair Rebecca Kelly Slaughter put forward an argument that U.S. enforcement agencies should consider antitrust statutes as “a tool for combatting structural racism” by prioritizing competition enforcement in highly concentrated industries where people of color are marginalized. These enforcement decisions are especially consequential given the resource constraints that federal antitrust agencies face. According to Michael Kades of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, appropriations for the FTC and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) decreased 18% from 2010 to 2018 when adjusting for inflation. These constraints force federal enforcement agencies to choose which antitrust actions to pursue or abstain from; each active choice potentially impacts marginalized communities within the related sector.

It is possible that some of the newly introduced House legislation could offer an opportunity to advance racial equity by further expanding the parameters of competition enforcement. For example, the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act could increase funding for federal antitrust enforcers—potentially allowing for more litigation capacity in situations where anticompetitive behavior, directly or indirectly, harms marginalized groups or contributes to algorithmic biases. The Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act could require applicable platforms to offer data portability and interoperability options, potentially giving users greater flexibility to stop using a platform with biased or discriminatory algorithmic outcomes. The American Innovation and Choice Online Act, Platform Competition and Opportunity Act, and Ending Platform Monopolies Act could each introduce new restrictions on mergers and acquisitions and prohibit certain anticompetitive behaviors by large platforms, including those that may imperil civil rights. But, to ensure leveled pursuits of markets that are both competitive and antiracist, more granular discussions about racial equity and inclusion must take place in parallel with these overarching antitrust reforms.

Such discussions must also include ways to promote diverse representation within the FTC and DOJ. According to recent reports, only 2.85% of attorneys at DOJ’s Antitrust Division and 4.1% at the FTC’s Bureau of Competition identify as Black. Although initiatives like the FTC’s Diversity Council and DOJ Antitrust Division’s Diversity Committee aim to promote inclusive recruitment and retention, there are areas where both agencies can improve. The FTC and DOJ career websites both list unpaid legal internships, for example, which create financial barriers for law students from underrepresented backgrounds to enter the litigation or competition enforcement fields.

Even worse, in late 2020, the DOJ reportedly canceled agency-wide diversity and inclusion programs in response to an executive order from former President Trump. While Khan’s confirmation is historic, as are Kristen Clarke and Vanita Gupta’s DOJ appointments within the Biden administration, both agencies still critically lack representation of Black and Latino nominees to senior-level positions. No current FTC commissioner identifies as Black or Latino and only three Black commissioners have served since the agency’s inception in 1914. Because the FTC and DOJ make enforcement decisions that affect communities of color and other marginalized populations, antitrust law cannot become a tool to dismantle systemic racism without more inclusive representation in both leadership and general workforce positions.

As broad antitrust reform continues within Congress and federal enforcement agencies, we must take seriously that negative effects on consumers extend far beyond monetary prices and ultimately include racial inequities—which, paradoxically, can be a core reason for such economic inequalities in the first place. When the six House bills were introduced, their co-sponsors stated that there was a need to consider how antitrust affects certain values, including quality, privacy, and security, censored speech, control over how we see and understand the world, innovation, and choice. It’s time to add racial justice to that list.